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Offices of Goodness: Influence without Authority in Federal Agencies
By Margo Schlanger *
Draft (September 9, 2013)
PLEASE DO NOT CITE, QUOTE, OR DISTRIBUTE
Introduction
Inducing governmental organizations to do the right thing is the central problem of public
administration. Especially sharp challenges arise when “the right thing” means executing not
only a primary mission but also constraints on that mission (what Philip Selznick aptly labeled
“precarious values” 1). In a classic example, we want police to prevent and respond to crime and
maintain public order, but to do so without infringing anyone’s civil rights. In the federal
government, if Congress or another principal wants an executive agency to pay attention not only
to its mission but also to some other constraining or conflicting value—I will call that additional
value, generically, “Goodness” 2—that principal has several choices. Congress can somehow
impel the agency to try to seed the constraining value widely throughout its ranks—for example,
by using supervision tools or incentives to get many agency employees to pay attention to
Goodness. 3 Or Congress can empower some other federal organization more closely aligned
with Goodness to play an augmented role in the agency’s affairs. 4 This Article addresses a third
© Margo Schlanger 2013
*

Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I had the privilege of serving as the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties for two years beginning 2010 and as an advisor to the
Secretary of Homeland Security in 2012 and some of 2013. While those experiences obviously inform the views
expressed here, those views are entirely personal and not in any way attributable to DHS. Thanks to my University
of Michigan colleagues for helpful comments on presentations of the idea underlying this article in both a Fawley
workshop and governance lunch, to Tino Cuéllar, Liz Magill, Gillian Metzger, and Sallyanne Payton for their
generous and generative conversations with me on the topic, to participants in the 2013 Law & Society Association
panel in which I presented it (especially Tom Baker, the session’s discussant), and, as always, to Sam Bagenstos.
All the primary documents cited below are attributed to their current locations on the Internet—but in order to
preserve them for future years, I have assembled them and they are also posted at http://margoschlanger.net, in an
Appendix to this Article. [Not posted yet]
1

See PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 119-33 (1957)

2

I capitalize the term Goodness to indicate that the word is functioning as a stand-in for something of value, not
as an endorsement of any particular normative judgment.
3

See, e.g., Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies,
33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 35 (2009) (describing a “range of methods [to induce an agency to pursue a secondary
goal”: changing the internal incentives structure of the agency by increasing the incentives provided for less
measurable or otherwise secondary goals; working directly to change the mission of the agency through political and
bureaucratic pressure; imposing procedures on the agency that require it explicitly to consider ‘secondary’ goals in
its decision-making process; or hiring personnel in the agency who are professionally or personally committed to
advancing one or more of the ‘secondary’ goals”).
4

This approach is the subject of a rash of articles in the past several years examining the rationales and results of
“overlapping” and “underlapping” jurisdiction among agencies. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and

1
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approach: furthering Goodness by giving it an institutional home, a subsidiary agency office I
call an “Office of Goodness.” Offices of Goodness have often been created by Congress when it
has sought to instill in particular agencies values that are important to the moving Members but
less than central to the agencies; presidents, too, have created them for a variety of political ends.
Activities by Offices of Goodness possess a logic and function worthy of academic
recognition and explication; both policymakers and scholars should care about how, and when,
Offices of Goodness work. But while Offices of Goodness are frequently established in federal
agencies, they are all but invisible in scholarship. 5 And the resulting knowledge gap is
particularly problematic right now, because President Obama has just proposed a new Office of
Goodness, within the National Security Agency, to increase oversight of surveillance activities. 6
An Office of Goodness’s success is far from guaranteed. For such an Office to actually increase
Goodness in its agency, its staff must skillfully use a toolkit constrained by the Office’s
placement within the agency they seek to influence, and they must avoid the twin shoals of
impotence or capture/assimilation. This Article analyzes the relevant dynamics. I begin by
describing a paradigmatic Office of Goodness, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and four issues in which it was involved between 2009 and
2012. These examples then inform a more general discussion of available tools, and how the
Office’s relationships with other stakeholders can increase or undermine its staff’s influence and
commitment, which I suggest are the prerequisites for effectiveness.
At an increased level of generality, the Article is in conversation with the “structure and
process” strand of positive political theory. The germinal articles in this literature were by the

Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency
Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745 (2011); Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and
Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENV. L.J. 237 (2011); Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
181 (2011); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131
(2012); Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183 (2013).
5

An extremely useful exception is Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in
Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2008), which analyses the Privacy Offices at DHS and the
Department of State, and offers thoughts about why, faced with similar issues, the former managed a far more robust
set of interventions in its agency than the latter. It is, of course, also possible to find references here and there that
acknowledge the strategy. See, e.g., MARK H. MOORE & MARGARET JANE GATES, INSPECTORS-GENERAL:
JUNKYARD DOGS OR MAN’S BEST FRIEND (1986) (“In sum [in passing the 1978 Inspectors General Act], Congress
chose the usual governmental response to an emerging political demand for some new purpose or value to be
expressed in the operations of government—the creation of a separate, strengthened administrative unit whose
primary goal is to advance the purpose or value that justified its creation.”); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY:
WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 371 (1989) (“If the organization must perform a diverse
set of tasks, those tasks that are not part of the core mission will need special protection. This requires giving
autonomy to the subordinate tasks subunit (for example, by providing for them a special organizational niche) and
creating a career track so that talented people performing non-mission tasks can rise to high rank in the agency.”).
6

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in a Press Conference (Aug. 9, 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/09/remarks-president-press-conference (explaining that the
National Security Agency is “taking steps to put in place a full-time civil liberties and privacy officer”). At the same
press conference, the President also stated his support for a related, though slightly different, approach with respect
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, proposing to work with Congress to “make sure civil liberties
concerns have an independent voice in appropriate cases” in front of that court. Id.

2
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three collaborators known collectively as McNollgast; 7 they argued that Congress can “stack the
deck” in favor of agency outcomes it prefers, and facilitate its own focused oversight, by
delineating the structure and process agencies must follow as they formulate policy. Structure
and process theorists have analyzed numerous delegation choices through this lens, including
notice and comment rulemaking, 8 choice of agency mission and jurisdiction 9; use of “impact
assessments,” 10 and constraints on appointment and removal of personnel. 11 Other political
scientists studying agency design focus more on the president and less on Congress. 12 Either
way, as a prominent recent article by Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule summarizes,
this literature for the most part treats “the agency” as a unit and asks how and why
institutions such as Congress and the President impose various structural and procedural
requirements on agencies. In other words, this literature (for the most part) asks how the
black box should be shaped, not what lies inside it. 13
This Article (like Magill and Vermeule’s piece) takes as its subject the complex interactions
among agency personnel inside that black box, and how those interactions are affected by and
themselves affect outsiders.
Scholarship written in the field of public administration or bureaucratic theory has a
different blind spot. Research about how bureaucracies work 14 focuses almost entirely on
7

Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of
Political Control, 3 J. L. & ECON. 243 (1987); Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast,
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75
VA. L. REV. 341 (1989); see also Arthur Lupia & Matthew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability,
57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (1994).
8

See sources cited supra note 7.

9

E.g., Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction, supra note 4; Jonathan Macey, Organizational
Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992).
10

E.g., McNollGast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 7, at 263-266; see also Bamberger & Mulligan,
Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 5.
11

See, e.g., Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of
Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 459 (2008) (“By placing limits on the President’s power to appoint and
remove independent agency heads as well as mandating limits on the number of the President’s own partisans that
can be appointed, Congress made use of an institutional design that sought to limit presidential control of
independent agencies.”). For a guide to the public choice literature on agency design, see Jacob E. Gersen,
Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne
Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010).
12

E.g., DAVID LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN (2003).

13

Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032 (2011). (The
point essentially holds for David Lewis’s book, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design, supra note 12,
because Lewis treats individual bureaus separately, rather than as parts of agencies. See infra note 21.) Magill and
Vermeule examined how administrative law doctrine empowers or disempowers particular actors within federal
agencies.
14

Classics include HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1960);
ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967); JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND
APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM (1978); MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL
BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE (1980); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY,

3
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operational bureaucracies—bureaus that themselves issue regulations or carry out programs, or
offices that supervise such bureaus, not offices that operate by influence instead of chain-ofcommand authority. 15 Work in bureaucratic theory thus fails to offer a full account of the
networks of authority and influence that comprise modern federal agencies. This Article’s
observations help to fill that gap, by focusing in particular on personnel who offer advice, rather
than run agency operations, and elaborating some of the ways this distinction makes a difference.
Part I sets the stage, identifying definitional features of an Office of Goodness, and
describing the structure and authorities of the Office I know best. For two years in the first term
of the Obama Administration, I ran the Department of Homeland Security’s Office for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) as the presidentially appointed (but not Senate confirmed)
Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. CRCL sits in the DHS Office of the Secretary; it
employs about a hundred civil servants, who carry out tasks ranging from administration of the
Department’s Equal Employment Opportunity program to civil rights inspection of immigration
detention facilities to civil liberties review of classified information sharing agreements. 16 In
Part II, I turn to four important controversies in which CRCL was a participant: the DHS role in
information sharing relating to the Occupy movement; review of electronic device border search
policy; Border Patrol’s policy relating to interpretation assistance for local law enforcement; and
the inter-agency negotiation over guidelines governing data ingestion and retention by the
National Counterterrorism Center. (Of course the discussion here is my own and does not
represent the views of the Department of Homeland Security or the Administration more
generally. Also, while whatever insight I can bring to bear is obviously inseparable from my
own work history and experiences, all the information reported comes from publically available
sources, which are cited.) I tell these stories in some detail in order to ground the subsequent
analysis.
Part III increases the analytic altitude and analyzes more systematically the ways in
which Offices of Goodness intervene in agency operations. These interventions use a variety of
methods, including:

supra note 5. Or, more recently, see, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE
GOVERNMENT GOVERN? (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson, eds., 1989); AMY BETH ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN:
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC (1999); DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC
AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001);
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Coalitions, Autonomy, and Regulatory Bargains in Public Health Law, in PREVENTING
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss
eds. forthcoming); STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD
REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008); DANIEL P. CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE
AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010). Two sources providing helpful guides to the public
choice part of the literature are Ronald Wintrobe, Modern Bureaucratic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC
CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 429 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997), and Terry M. Moe, The Positive Theory of Public
Bureaucracy, in id., at 455.
15

One insightful exception is ROBERT A. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST POLICY (1980).
16

See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ANN. REP., FY 2011
(2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/report-office-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Inclusion in policy formulation working groups
Clearance authority
Advice
Training and technical assistance
Program or operational review, including data analysis
Complaint investigation
Outreach to outside groups
Generation of documents
Congressional reporting

Each method comes with its own risks and benefits, which are discussed.
And increasing the elevation another 10,000 feet , in Part IV, I examine in more detail the
relationships that either support or undermine Office influence and commitment to Goodness, its
assigned value. Both influence and commitment, I argue, are continually under threat, and both
depend crucially on external reinforcement, whether from Congress, the White House, nongovernmental organizations, the courts, or other agencies. Again, I develop the dynamics in
some detail.
It has recently become a commonplace observation that the power of the presidency has
expanded to the point that tripartite separation of powers model, which relies on Congress and
the courts to rein in the Executive Branch, may not be up to the task. Much scholarship (and
perhaps even practice) now emphasizes, instead or in addition, internal accountability
mechanisms. 17 Neal Katyal, for example, describes “internal separation of powers” methods, to
“create checks and balances within the executive branch.” He notes that “the apparatuses are
familiar—separate and overlapping cabinet offices, mandatory review of government action by
different agencies, civil-service protections for agency workers, reporting requirements to
Congress, and an impartial decision-maker to resolve inter-agency conflicts.” 18 Likewise, Jack
Goldsmith celebrates “something new and remarkable: giant distributed networks of lawyers,
investigators, and auditors, both inside and outside the executive branch, that rendered U.S.
fighting forces and intelligence services more transparent than ever, and that enforced legal and
political constraints, small and large, against them.” 19
Both scholars and the American polity, would, to quote Gillian Metzger, “benefit[] from
paying greater attention to internal administrative design, and in particular . . . analyzing
17

As Gillian Metzger emphasizes, the various internal and external methods interact crucially. See Gillian E.
Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L.J. 423,
426 (2009). See also, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655 (2006) (analyzing the structure of federal
intelligence offices); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, “Securing” the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the
Federal Security Agency, 1939-1953, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 587 (2009) (analyzing the structure of the Federal Security
Agency).
18

Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within,
115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2318 (2006)
19

JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at xi-xii (2012).
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what types of administrative structures are likely to prove effective and appropriate in
different contexts.” 20 In my view, the Office of Goodness strategy, already used by Congress
and other principals, can be at least partially effective and appropriate. It is the ambition of this
Article to raise the strategy’s visibility, placing it more prominently on the menu of internal
separation of powers devices for it to be further analyzed and assessed.
I. What is an Office of Goodness?
A. Key Characteristics
By “Office of Goodness” I mean an office within an operational agency that has each of
three features:
First, Offices of Goodness are advisory rather than operational. Offices of Goodness
help other parts of the agency get work done; they are not the offices (or bureaus, to use the
nomenclature most common in scholarship 21) that themselves carry out the agency’s mission.
This means that Offices of Goodness must operate by persuasion or coercion of others.
Scholarship examining the dynamics of bureaucratic autonomy is highly relevant by analogy, 22
but for Offices of Goodness, power lies less in autonomy than in influence—the ability to thwart
another office’s autonomy. 23
Second, Offices of Goodness are value-infused. 24 The observations here apply to offices
that are explicitly assigned to further a particular value that is not otherwise primary for the
agency in which they sit. That value could be civil rights, consumer welfare, fiscal rectitude, etc.
The Article calls it Goodness, but is agnostic on whether Goodness is actually good. A note in
this regard: Where the value in question is “lawfulness,” the Office of Goodness is likely to be
the agency’s Office of General Counsel. Jack Goldsmith writes, for example, of “the CIA’s 150
or so lawyers,” naming them the “street-level bureaucrats” responsible for enforcing
“compliance with the bevy of laws that Congress imposes and that the executive branch

20

Metzger, supra note 17.

21

See LEWIS, supra note 12, at 41 (“‘Bureau’ is a general term that refers to many different sub-units within
larger departments that have different names such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service,
or National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Like departments, bureaus vary in size and significance. In
many departments the sub-department bureaus have significant autonomy and authority; many departments are
better characterized as holding companies of a number of distinct agencies rather than one large agencies. The
autonomy of sub-department agencies derives from a number of sources. Most have legal authority delegated to the
bureau chief directly by legislation, rather than to the department secretary or the President. Large bureaus are also
generally headed by Senate-confirmed political appointees, making bureau chiefs accountable to congressional
committees directly rather than through higher departmental officials.”).
22

The leading source on agency autonomy and the techniques used to obtain and sustain it is DANIEL P.
CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATIONS
IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2002).
23

See PHILIP B. HEYMANN, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 150-152 (1987) (analyzing persuasion in
federal agencies).
24

Cf. PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (1957).
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translates into more detailed executive orders, regulations, and directives.” 25 Valuable (though
limited) work has been done on general counsels’ offices 26; this Article builds on that
scholarship, adding detailed description of an Office of Goodness that is not an Office of General
Counsel, and also moving up one level of generality, to think about this type of office as an
analytic category.
Third, Offices of Goodness are internal and dependent on their agency. The dynamics of
a fully internal office are very different from one that has structural separation and independence.
I deal here with non-independent internal offices, although of course independence is not
dichotomous but rather exists along a spectrum. 27 In my view, this is why the burgeoning work
on the far more independent offices of Inspectors General is enlightening but distinct. As that
work describes, notwithstanding their organizational chart placement, Inspectors General have,
at least since 1978, answered much more to Congress than to their Department heads. 28
B. What is the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties?
The head of the Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties (CRCL)—a presidential appointee reporting directly to the Secretary of Homeland
Security—is required by Congress to “oversee” DHS “compliance with constitutional, statutory,
regulatory, policy, and other civil rights and civil liberties requirements.” 29 The relevant statutes
25

GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 19, at 93. See also, e.g., Afsheen John Radsan, Sed Quis
Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: The CIA’s Office of General Counsel? 2 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 201 (2008).
26

For analysis of the dynamics of federal Offices of the General Counsel, see, for example, sources cited supra
note 25; Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1991);
Magill & Vermeule, Allocating Power, supra note 13, at 1032, 1058-62, 1072-73; Harold Hongju Koh & Aaron
Zelinsky, Practicing International law in the Obama Administration, 35 YALE J. INTL. L. ONLINE 4 (2009); Laura A.
Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International Law Compliance, 104 AM. J.
INT’L L. 1 (2010) (about Judge Advocate General’s Corps lawyers).
27

See, e.g., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And Executive Agencies),
98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013); Lisa S. Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63
VAND. L. REV. 599 (2010); Marshall J. Breger & Gary Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111 (2000).
28

See Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 65
STAN. L. REV. (2013); Ryan M. Check & Afsheen J. Radsan, One Lantern in the Darkest Night: The CIA’s Inspector
General, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 247 (2010); Kathryn E. Newcomer, The Changing Nature of Accountability:
The Role of Inspector General in Federal Agencies, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 129 (1998); Michael R. Bromwich,
Running Special Investigations: The Inspector General Model, 86 GEO. L.J. 2027 (1998); PAUL C. LIGHT,
MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993); INSPECTORS
GENERAL: A NEW FORCE IN EVALUATION (Michael Hendricks et al. eds., 1990); Margaret J. Gates & Marjorie F.
Knowles, The Inspector General Act in the Federal Government: A New Approach to Accountability, 36 ALA. L.
REV. 473 (1984). CARMEN R. APAZA, INTEGRITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNMENT: HOMELAND SECURITY
AND THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (2011); MOORE & GATES, supra note 5.
29

See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 705, 116 Stat. 2135, 2219-20 (codified as
amended at 6 U.S.C. § 345(a)), amended by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub L. No.
108-458, sec. 8303, § 705(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3867; 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1; Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, sec. 803, § 1062, 121 Stat. 266, 360-362. The Homeland
Security Act of 2002 established the office and directed the Secretary to appoint its head, who was instructed much
more briefly to “review and assess information alleging abuses of civil rights, civil liberties, and racial and ethnic
profiling by employees and officials of the Department.” Pub. L. 107-296, Sec. 705, 116 Stat 2135, 2220 (2002).
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empower the office to deal with both general policy development and review, and with more
specific (and individual) civil rights complaints. CRCL’s statutes instruct the office to assist the
Secretary and Department offices in policy development and implementation, including by
periodically reviewing policies and procedures “to ensure that the protection of civil rights and
civil liberties is appropriately incorporated into Department programs and activities.” The
statutes also require the office to review and assess information and investigate complaints
concerning civil rights and civil liberties abuses by DHS employees—including, explicitly called
out by statute—alleged “profiling on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion.” In addition, CRCL
is required to more generally “ensure that [the Department] has adequate procedures to receive,
investigate, respond to, and redress” civil liberties complaints. 30
So that CRCL can carry out these tasks, the Secretary is instructed to ensure that the
CRCL Officer:
“(1) has the information, material, and resources necessary to fulfill the functions of such
officer;
“(2) is advised of proposed policy changes;
“(3) is consulted by decision makers; and
“(4) is given access to material and personnel the officer determines to be necessary to
carry out the functions of such officer.” 31
And, crucially, Office is subjected to specific congressional reporting obligations. The CRCL
Officer is required to file quarterly Congressional reports about the office’s activities, including,
most importantly, “the type of advice provided and the response given to such advice;” and “a
summary of the disposition of . . . complaints, the reviews and inquiries conducted, and the
impact of the activities of such officer.” 32 Correspondingly, the Secretary is required to file an
annual congressional report “detailing any allegations of [civil rights or civil liberties] abuses . . .
of this section and any actions taken by the Department in response to such allegations.” 33
Congress has also made subsequent more specific use of CRCL and its head, instructing
the Secretary to “consult” with the CRCL Officer in developing several specified programs, 34
requiring CRCL to develop or certify civil liberties training for particular personnel, 35 and asking

30

42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1(a)(4).

31

42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1(d).

32

42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1(f)(2)(D).

33

6 U.S.C. § 345(b).

34

See 6 U.S.C. § 124h (requiring the Secretary to consult with the CRCL Officer in establishing a DHS Fusion
Center Initiative); 6 U.S.C. § 1138 (requiring the same in carrying out certain public transportation research and
development projects); 6 U.S.C. § 1168 (requiring the same for railroad security research and development); 6
U.S.C. § 1185 (requiring the same for bus security research and development).
35

See 6 U.S.C. § 124h(c)(4)(A)(ii) (requiring each DHS officer or intelligence analyst assigned to a fusion center
to undergo civil liberties training “developed, supported, or sponsored by . . . the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties of the Department”); 6 U.S.C. § 124(i) (same for Information Sharing Fellows).
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for CRCL-authored reports both before and after programs are implemented. 36 In addition, DHS
Secretaries have publically assigned a variety of tasks to CRCL, declaring the office responsible
for training, policy assessment and recommendations, and particular participation in specified
Departmental tasks and processes. Several of these are discussed in part I.C, below.
CRCL is very different from the civil rights offices of most federal agencies. In contrast
with CRCL’s inward-looking advisory/review/watch-dog function, most agency offices of civil
rights (OCRs) combine a more substantively limited role inside the agency—administering equal
employment opportunity programs—with a more operational regulatory role outside the
agency—enforcing the antidiscrimination obligations of supported organizations. 37 (The
Department of Agriculture’s Civil Rights Office, described in the Border Patrol Interpretation
section below (part I.b.3), is a partial exception from this general pattern. And the most wellknown of the federal civil rights offices, the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division is
different altogether; as a litigating office of the Justice Department, its primary mission is to sue
non-federal defendants, so it is nearly entirely outwardly focused.) But while DHS CRCL is
unusual among cabinet department civil rights offices, it is far from unique in its structure.
DHS’s foundational 2002 statute birthed not only CRCL but its DHS sibling, the Privacy Office,
along similar lines. 38 And a 2007 statute that confirmed and expanded CRCL’s authority
similarly either confirmed or led to the creation of analogous offices—although generally
combining privacy and civil liberties, and not mentioning civil rights—within the Departments
of Justice, Defense, State, Treasury, Health and Human Services, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 39 The structure of each office
varies; some are led by presidential appointees, others by political appointees who must be
approved by the Presidential Personnel Office but are technically appointed by the Department
Head; still others are led by career staff. 40 Expanding the field of vision beyond either civil

36

See 6 U.S.C. § 1138 (requiring the CRCL Office to conduct appropriate reviews of certain DHS public
transportation research and development projects), 6 U.S.C. § 1168 (same, for railroad security research and
development), 1185 (same, for bus security research and development); Pub. L. No. 110-53 (not codified in
pertinent part), §§ 511 (requiring the CRCL Officer to submit a report to Congress and others on the civil liberties
impact of the Fusion Center Initiative), 512 (same for Information Sharing Fellows Program), 521 (same for
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group), 1523 (same for Northern Border Railroad Passenger
program).
37

See, e.g., Stephen C. Halpern, On the Limits of the Law: The Ironic Legacy of Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act (1995) (describing operations of Education OCR); Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights
Enforcement in the Modern Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath
of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 215 (2003) (same for HHS OCR); Olatunde
Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 101 (2012)
(same for HUD Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity); JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS, HOW
PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY (1989) (same for Health, Education and Welfare OCR).
38

See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, Sec. 222, 116 Stat 2135, 2155 (2002) (codified as
amended at 6 U.S.C. §142); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-2.
39

42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1(a); see also Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108458, §§ 1011, 1061, 118 Stat. 3638, 3658-59, 3688 (creating a Civil Liberties Protection Officer within the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence and a Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer within the Executive Office of the
President).
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rights or civil liberties, offices that satisfy the three “Offices of Goodness” criteria set out above
are scattered throughout government. They have titles like the Department of Energy’s Office of
Economic Impact and Diversity, or the Internal Revenue Service’s Office of the Taxpayer
Advocate. 41 Many are called Ombudsman’s offices. 42 It is beyond the scope of this Article to
either catalog or discuss all of these offices—the point here is only that their use by Congress is a
general regulatory strategy worthy of analysis.
II. What do Offices of Goodness Do? Four CRCL Vignettes.
In this section, I describe four civil rights controversies in which CRCL played a role, 43
to thicken the description of available strategies and challenges. I look in turn at (1) the DHS
role in information sharing relating to the Occupy movement in late 2011; (2) DHS electronic
device border search policy; (3) Border Patrol’s policy relating to interpretation assistance for
Northern Border law enforcement agencies; and (4) the inter-agency negotiation over guidelines
governing data retention by the National Counterterrorism Center. For each controversy, the
narrative mentions the relevant tools, which are discussed more thoroughly in Part III.
A. DHS and Occupy
September 2011 saw the birth of the Occupy Wall Street protest movement in New York
City; over subsequent weeks and months, Occupy grew and spread across the country. In many
cities, Occupy began that fall with live-in encampments in parks and other public spaces. Nearly
everywhere, city governments and law enforcement eventually enforced various curfew and anticamping rules and shut down the Occupy camps. The Department of Homeland Security was
involved in several ways. Occasionally a unit of DHS was a target of a protest. For example, an
“Occupy Stewart” protest was held in November 2011 in front of the Stewart Detention Center,
40

For example, the Defense Department’s Senior Agency Official for Privacy, and Civil Liberties Officer is a
career member of the armed services. See Michael L. Rhodes, Director of Administration and Management,
http://www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=164; Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Office,
http://dpclo.defense.gov/civil/About_The_Office/dpclo_structure.html#leadership. The Department of Justice Chief
Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer is a political appointee. And the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Civil Liberties Protection Officer is a career civil servant.
41

For a discussion of the IRS Office of Taxpayer Advocate, see IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, OVERSIGHT OF THE
OFFICE OF TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND ACTIONS (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/irsob/reports/taxpayer_advocate_oversight.pdf (last visited August 16, 2013).
42

Outward-facing ombudsman’s offices are embedded, for example, in, inter alia, the Securities and Exchange
Commission; Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of
Public Engagement; Consumer Product Safety Commission, Office of Education, Global Outreach and Small
Business Ombudsman; and Small Business Administration. DHS also has a freestanding Ombudsman for
Citizenship and Immigration Services. For background, see The Ombudsman in Federal Agencies, Admin. Conf. of
the United States, Recommendation 90-2, 1 C.F.R. § 305.90-2 (1993); Office of the Chairman, Administrative
Conference of the United States, The Ombudsman: A Primer for Federal Agencies (1991). On internal federal
ombudsman’s offices, for workers, see Leah Meltzer, The Federal Workplace Ombuds, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 549, 559-97 (1998).
43

My own personal involvement in three of these controversies appears in the documents cited, however, I
played no direct role in the Occupy issue.
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an immigration detention facility in Lumpkin, Georgia. 44 The Coast Guard and CBP (and to a
lesser extent ICE) also monitored what was going on at several sea port protests, which had the
potential of affecting their operations. 45 And DHS’s Federal Protective Service, which is the law
enforcement agency with responsibility for most of the nation’s federal buildings, took note of
protests in the vicinity of those buildings 46 and was the agency that enforced encampment
prohibitions in (apparently) one location. 47
For the Federal Protective Service and for state and local law enforcement (often working
through “fusion centers,” entities that are not part of the federal government, but are partially
funded by, and networked with, DHS), the civil liberties challenge was to maintain “situational
awareness,”—that is, knowledge of what was going on sufficient to facilitate appropriate police
planning and presence—without crossing over into more intrusive and objectionable monitoring
of First Amendment protected protest activity. 48 Scattered throughout thousands of pages of
relevant documents obtained via Freedom of Information Act request from DHS by Truthout, a
non-profit independent news organization, 49 is evidence of efforts to meet that challenge. For
example, one document describes the stance of the Northern California Regional Intelligence
Center (NCRIC), a fusion center in San Francisco: “Other than a few smashed windows at a
number of banks, today’s events have remained First Amendment protected activities. NCRIC is
not monitoring protected activity, but is in touch with the Oakland EOC in the event
circumstances change.” 50 And when in October 2011, a report summarizing the Occupy protests
to date and attributed to the DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate’s Office of
Infrastructure Protection was posted (and then reported and reposted on Rolling Stone’s blog
site); the report was immediately pulled down; senior Department officials explained it was
unauthorized and out of compliance with DHS policy. 51
44

Jim Mustian, Crowd Calls for Closing of Stewart Detention Center; Two Arrested, GA. LEDGER-ENQUIRER
(Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/2011/11/18/1824958/crowd-calls-for-closing-of-stewart.html.
45

See E-mails Among DHS Staff During November and December 2011, in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA DOCUMENT
RESPONSE 95, 197, 292-94, 305-07, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/353138-latest-batch-of-dhs-occupydocuments-contains.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2013) (discussing protests at several sea ports in November and
December 2011).
46

See Jason Leopold, DHS Emails Question Federal Law Enforcement’s Role in Violence at Occupy Wall Street
and Oakland Rallies, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 28 2013), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/15389-newly-released-dhsemails-questions-federal-law-enforcements-role-in-violence-at-ows-rallies-in-oakland-and-new-york (citing DHS
FOIA Request, http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/625736-ows-nppd-region-1-final.html (last visited Aug.
13, 2013)).
47

See, e.g., E-mail from DHS spokesman Chris Ortman to DHS Secretary’s Office staff, Nov. 1, 2011, in
5/3/2012 DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 45, at 45 (statement on the record describing FPS role in
Portland Schrunk Plaza arrests).
48

S. SELECT COMM. STUDY GOV’T OPERATIONS, 2 INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS,
S. DOC. NO. 94-755, at 221 (2d Sess. 1976).
49

See Jason Leopold, DHS Turns Over Occupy Wall Street Documents to Truthout, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 20, 2012),
http://truth-out.org/news/item/8012-dhs-turns-over-occupy-wall-street-documents-to-truthout#files.
50

E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted], in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 45, at 95.

51

The report remains available at http://www1.rollingstone.com/extras/13637_DHS%20IP%20Special.pdf. The
back and forth on pulling it down is discussed in email traffic FOIA’d and posted by Truthout. See Jason Leopold,
Top DHS Officials Went Ballistic Over Rolling Stone Contributor Michael Hasting’s OWS Report, Internal Emails
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Even situational awareness activities received some criticism from the civil liberties
left—an article in Salon, for example, described them as a “policy of daily spying on activists” 52;
this was then described on the New York Times website by a civil liberties advocate as
“inappropriate surveillance of protesters associated with Occupy Wall Street.” 53 But such
criticism fails to engage the reasonable needs of law enforcement agencies with responsibilities
for federal buildings. It’s not obviously unreasonable for Federal Protective Service personnel to
notice who is planning large events near the buildings they protect; in fact, it might be
irresponsible for police not to notice such events.
Units of DHS designated to help “fuse” information for many law enforcement
agencies—the DHS National Operations Center and also DHS intelligence analysts assigned to
the fusion centers—did not have such situational awareness needs. Accordingly, the challenge
for them was a little bit less challenging; because their mission is more limited (covering
homeland security matters, only) a cleaner solution is possible. For example, when Chicago’s
police department asked the National Operations Center to circulate to law enforcement in seven
other cities an “RFI” (Request for Information) on Occupy encampments and arrests, 54 that
request was first distributed but then quickly recalled by top management, who explained: “DHS
I&A [Office of Intelligence & Analysis] personnel—both at Headquarters and in the field—may
NOT be engaged in any efforts to gather information on First Amendment-protected activities
that have no direct nexus to violence or that are otherwise outside the scope of DHS I&A
authorities. Such inquiries should be strictly limited to law enforcement channels.” 55
So far I’ve quoted various DHS actors’ nods towards First Amendment values. But what
about CRCL? CRCL’s involvement had several related strands, described below. CRCL’s
training role may have raised awareness of First Amendment red flags, and also ratified CRCL’s
role and expertise. In addition, CRCL used that role and expertise to explain and underscore the
importance of avoiding First Amendment infringements. And finally, in some limited situations,
CRCL had clearance authority, so that CRCL approval was more or less required for
promulgation of a document.
Training. In the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
Congress required that each DHS officer or intelligence analyst assigned to a fusion center
undergo civil liberties training “developed, supported, or sponsored” by CRCL. 56 The same law
Show, TRUTHOUT (July 31, 2012), http://truth-out.org/news/item/10634-dhs-on-rolling-stone-reporter-michaelhastingss-ows-report-he-can-be-provocative-help-him-understand-our-mission. The emails themselves are posted at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/405431/ows-final-release-package-part2.pdf, at 78, 94.
52

Natasha Lennard, DHS Had Policy of Daily Spying on Activists, SALON (Apr. 3, 2013),
http://www.salon.com/2013/04/03/dhs_had_policy_of_daily_spying_on_activists.
53

Jameel Jaffer, Privacy is Worth Protecting, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013, 10:00:00 AM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/06/09/is-the-nsa-surveillance-threat-real-or-imagined.
54

See E-mails from Chicago Police Department Officials to Other Police Department Officials, in 5/3/2012 DHS
FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 45, at 245-57.
55

E-mails from [redacted] to [redacted], in id. at 251, 266, 270.

56

6 U.S.C. § 124h(c)(4)(A)(ii).
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likewise required that each fusion center provide “appropriate privacy and civil liberties training”
for all personnel, “in coordination with” both the DHS Privacy Office and CRCL. 57 The training
provided is limited: CRCL gives the DHS intelligence analysts just a few hours’ overview of
civil rights and civil liberties background, and trains trainers (and provides materials) for the
fusion center personnel. Critics have suggested this is inadequate 58—although perhaps it is
sufficient for raising awareness, if not for creating experts. In any event, the training
requirement does introduce each of the intelligence analysts to the existence and role of CRCL.
The results are evident in the Occupy FOIA document in one email from an employee at the
Office of Intelligence & Analysis to a National Operations Center intelligence analyst, who had
received a law enforcement request for information about Occupy protests. The email warned:
[P]lease be very cautious in responding to requests related to constitutionally protected
activities. Feel free to reach out to our CR/CL office if you have any doubt when asked
to support requirement[s] you feel are questionable prior to taking any action.” 59
Similarly, after Pittsburgh’s municipal Office of Emergency Management and Homeland
Security (not part of DHS) distributed a “Threat Assessment” about Occupy Pittsburgh, 60 two
DHS employees who saw this document became concerned that it “might be advocating
surveillance and other countermeasures to be employed against activities protected under the 1st
Amendment,” and contacted CRCL to seek some kind of responsive training document “so that
in the future they [the local authors of the Threat Assessment] have a greater awareness of how
to develop intelligence assessments that don’t undermine Constitutionally protected speech and
assembly rights.” 61
Technical assistance. More directly within DHS’s own walls, staff from DHS’s Office of
Intelligence & Analysis explained in an October 17 email that they were receiving numerous
“questions and requests for information regarding Occupy Wall Street from a number of
component partners and intelligence officers.” The email explained their first answer:
“Recognizing that this is a first amendment-protected activity, we have recommended (on an ad
hoc basis when we received requests) that our Intelligence Officers refer inquiries to Fusion
Centers and avoid the topic altogether.” But the email requested more formal guidance from
CRCL and the DHS Privacy Office. 62

57

6 U.S.C. § 511(a).

58

See, e.g., S. PERM. SUBCOMM. INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. HOMELAND SEC. AND GOV’T AFFAIRS, FEDERAL
SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 49 (Oct. 3, 2012), available at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report_federal-support-for-and-involvement-in-state-and-local-fusionscenters.
59

E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted], in 5/3/2012 DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE, supra note 45, at 188.

60

Pittsburgh Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security FOIA Response,
http://nigelparry.com/enginefiles/uploads/occupyassessment.pdf (last visited on Aug. 13, 2013).
61

E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted], in DHS FOIA DOCUMENT RESPONSE (PART 1) 2, http://truthout.org/files/12-0048-First-Interim-Release_OWS_Part1.pdf (last visited on Aug. 13, 2013).
62

See E-mail from Shala Byers to [redacted], in id. at 5.
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Privacy Office and CRCL staff explained to the Office of Intelligence & Analysis
manager who requested the guidance that simply referring the inquiries to Fusion Centers might
“give the appearance that DHS is attempting to circumvent existing restrictions, policies, and
laws.” The right approach, they argued, was that “DHS should not report on activities when the
basis for reporting is political speech,” and should “also be loath to pass DHS requests for more
information on the protests along to the appropriate fusion centers without strong guidance that
the vast majority of activities occurring as part of these protests is protected.” Not that there was
a ban on reporting: “Persons demonstrating illegal or suspicious behavior and attempting to use
the protests to obscure their activity could be reported, as long as there is no attempt to link the
suspicious/illegal behavior to first amendment protected activity.” 63
The FOIA’d emails include resulting guidance promulgated by Office of Intelligence &
Analysis leadership to DHS intelligence analysts. It stated:
Activities such as speech and assembly (both of which are implicated in the planned
“occupy” protests) are protected by the First Amendment and generally DHS would not
collect information or report on these types of activities unless we had a compelling
interest to do so. Below is some general guidance that we hope you find helpful.
• The government may never collect or disseminate information based solely on
First Amendment protected activities, or conduct investigations on that basis.
• Generally, reporting should be about the violence or criminality of a particular
individual or group. Reporting on activities without a nexus to violence or
criminality often raises First Amendment concerns.
o To justify research into and creation of a product containing First
Amendment-protected activity, personnel should consider whether they
have a lawful predicate (e.g. a lawful purpose to perform their authorized
law enforcement functions or other activities, that is not based on the
protected activity itself).
o Once a lawful predicate has been established, personnel should ensure the
scope of the research and reporting on First Amendment-protected activity
is limited to the threat posed. This is often referred to as congruence.
• The treatment of groups that may be involved in the First Amendment protected
activity or related events should be even-handed and free of bias (e.g., not
reporting more extensively or negatively on one group based on their viewpoint
alone).
The email closed with an expression of collegiality: “Please let us know if you have any other
questions, or if you require CRCL support in any other way. The CRCL office has been
extremely helpful and responsive on this issue and they stand ready to assist.” 64
The emails include other evidence of more particularized advice seeking and giving. One
episode involved a DHS intelligence analyst who asked about an incident in which an SUV was
63

E-mail from Privacy office staff to [redacted], id. at 85.

64

Id.

14
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013

15

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 91 [2013]
Schlanger, Offices of Goodness. DRAFT (September 9, 2013) .

set on fire. He explained: “I ran across this today and was interested in a possible write up of the
event for the state and locals. Before I spent the time writing on this, however, I’d like to know
what objections CRCL might pose to such a product concerning the Occupy movement—which
has thus far been nonviolent.” 65 The email chain includes debate among CRCL staff members
about whether any reporting on the incident, at all, would be appropriate in light of the DHS
mission. What was sent back to the intelligence analyst notes that CRCL was:
particularly concerned about attribution of the incident. The article notes that the police
say they don’t know who set the fire or why they did it, and while some of the graffiti
contains slogans consistent with some of the Occupy movement’s protests, the police say
it would be ‘unfair to blame any one group’ for the incident, and the spokesperson for
Occupy Eugene denounced the event and said it was not part of their tactics. Unless there
is other intelligence that indicates that the vandalism can be attributed to the group, the
product would have to be very careful not to attribute the incident to the movement.”
Accordingly, “If I&A believes the incident in Eugene merits nationwide reporting, it
would be preferable for I&A to write up the incident in a manner that takes care not to
attribute the action to Occupy (absent further information), rather than to write a general
product about Occupy and add to that product a write-up of the incident (as the context of
the product would make it difficult to convey that we have no information that the
incident may be fairly attributed to Occupy, rather than someone merely sympathetic to
their ideology). Generally, it would be difficult for DHS to justify a product on the
Occupy movement at this time. As you note, the movement has been largely non-violent,
and what criminal activity has taken place has mostly been of the civil disobedience
variety (failure to secure/overstaying permits, non-violent resistance to arrest), with
occasional violent resistance to being removed from a location/arrested, etc., and it is
unclear what is appropriately attributable to the Occupy movement versus individuals
who may later enter into a conflict with policy. Other concerns appear to be health and
safety related (use of heating equipment, disposal of trash, etc). As these concerns
generally are localized and not related to domestic terrorism, to our knowledge, it would
be difficult for DHS to justify a product on what is largely First Amendment protected
activity that doesn’t appear to have a nexus to a DHS mission.
The intelligence analyst decided not to write the report.
Clearance authority. CRCL had not always played this influential a role in intelligence
reporting at DHS. In fact, in April 2009, an Office of Intelligence & Analysis report on “RightWing Extremism” 66 was issued over CRCL’s objection. 67 The report was marked “For Official

65

E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted], id. at 13.

66

See DEPT. HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: CURRENT
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT (Apr. 7, 2009),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf.
67

See Tom Brune, Analysts Ignored Objections on Extremism Report, Official Confirms, NEWSDAY (Apr. 17,
2009); Daryl Johnson, RIGHT-WING RESURGENCE: HOW A DOMESTIC TERRORIST THREAT IS BEING IGNORED (2012).
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Use Only” 68 but was widely distributed to law enforcement agencies, and promptly leaked and
posted online. 69 Defining right-wing extremism to include groups “that are mainly
antigovernment, rejecting federal authority in favor of state or local authority, or rejecting
government authority entirely,” as well as “groups and individuals that are dedicated to a single
issue, such as opposition to abortion or immigration,” it warned that gun control opponents and
veterans were plausible recruits to violent extremism, and cast aspersions on Republicans more
generally by stating that opposition to the Obama administration’s policy positions was
“galvaniz[ing]” extremists. 70 The resulting furor from conservative constituencies, 71 and then
from both Democrats and Republicans in Congress, 72 considerably enhanced CRCL’s authority;
the Secretary apologized to veterans for the report 73 and an internal directive was issued
requiring clearance of all non-classified intelligence analysis by CRCL personnel, as well as by
Privacy and the Office of the General Counsel. The clearance authority was not absolute, but to
issue a document over the leadership-level objection of one of those offices, Intelligence &
Analysis was required to appeal to the Deputy Secretary—a significant augmentation of the
reviewing offices’ influence. 74
Returning to the Occupy issue, what’s notable in the Occupy FOIA releases is that there
is no evidence of an actual DHS intelligence report about Occupy. This kind of product would
68

The FOUO designation was supposed to bar distribution outside of the government. See Department of
Homeland Security, Management Directive 11042.1, Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified (For Official Use
Only) Information, Jan. 6, 2005, available at
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_110421_safeguarding_sensitive_but_unclassified_informa
tion.pdf. It has since been officially supplanted by the designation “Controlled Unclassified Information.” See
Controlled Unclassified Information, Executive Order 13556 (Nov. 4, 2010).
69

The leak was to Rodger Hedgecock. The story is told in DARYL JOHNSON, RIGHT-WING RESURGENCE: HOW A
DOMESTIC TERROR THREAT IS BEING IGNORED (2012), written by the intelligence analyst who drafted the RightWing Extremism paper.
70

Id. at 2-3.

71

See, e.g., Michelle Malkin, Confirmed: The Obama DHS Hit Job on Conservatives is Real, MICHELLE MALKIN
(Apr. 14, 2009), http://michellemalkin.com/2009/04/14/confirme-the-obama-dhs-hit-job-on-conservatives-is-real,
(“the piece of crap report issued on April 7 is a sweeping indictment of conservatives”). Numerous organizations
responded by calling for the removal of Secretary Napolitano. She responded with an apology and a promise to
revamp the intelligence product clearance process, including by augmenting the authority of CRCL. Jackie
Kucinich, Napolitano Atones for DHS Report, ROLL CALL (May 7, 2009, 12:00 AM),
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/54_127/-34696-1.html.
72

See, e.g., Letter from Congressman Bennie Thompson to Secretary Janet Napolitano (April 14, 2009),
http://www.yallpolitics.com/images/ThompsonLetter041609.pdf (last visited on Aug. 13, 2013).
73

See Ginger Thompson, Extremist Report Draws Criticism; Prompts Apology, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2009, 3:03
PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/extremist-report-draws-criticism-prompts-apology/?_r=0.
74

See Hearing on FY2010 Budget for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland
Security Before the H. Homeland Security Subcomm. Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk
Assessment, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Bart Johnson, Acting Under Secretary) (“To strengthen our existing
processes, an interim clearance process was put in place shortly after the release of the April 7, 2009 assessment.
That process established mandatory review and concurrence by four offices - Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the
Privacy Office, Office of the General Counsel, and I&A’s Intelligence Oversight Section. Any non-concurrence that
could not be resolved was elevated to the Deputy Secretary for review, ensuring a much more coordinated review of
I&A’s products than had previously been in place.”).
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have been subject to CRCL’s clearance authority. Perhaps that’s because I&A leadership lacked
interest in such a product. Or perhaps it’s because clearance would have been implausible. As
one of the email chains between two CRCL employees notes:
W/r/t a larger report on the Occupy movement, do you mean that you don’t think CRCL
could clear on any product on OWS [Occupy Wall Street], generally? I tend to agree that
it would be difficult to clear on that, given that any concerns out of the movement thus far
are local matters: reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on protests, health and
safety issues, etc, all seem to be situational awareness issues (not domestic terrorismrelated) that apply only to locals dealing with particular protests, and therefore, lack a
DHS nexus for reporting. Given that their only foray into illegal activity, as a movement,
seems to be violating permit rules and clashes with the police over removals (mostly, but
not exclusively, through civil disobedience tactics), a product would tend to appear as
merely reporting on First Amendment activity.
All in all, the emails and documents paint a portrait of a large agency with many people
thinking hard—and, I think, appropriately—about the First Amendment issues. There are no
smoking guns of repressive action or inappropriate monitoring. 75 CRCL seems, from this
evidence, to have played an important out-of-view part, mostly in educating agency personnel
about the suggested non-interventionist approach, with that education reinforced by the
somewhat authoritative role in intelligence product review the office had accreted after a prior
public contretemps.
B. Laptop Searches
In February 2008, a Washington Post story profiled a number of American citizens who
claimed their cell-phones and laptops had been searched, copied, and even confiscated by U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) when they were questioned at the border on their return to
the United States from travel abroad. 76 The article’s news hook was a Freedom of Information
Act lawsuit filed the same day by the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Asian Law Caucus,
seeking CBP policy documents relating to such border searches. 77 While the issue had already

75

Truthout acknowledges this with some regret, noting: “[T]he public still does not have a complete picture of
what role, if any, the federal government played in dismantling the nationwide encampments. . . . Unfortunately,
about 250 pages of redacted documents released last week by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)
National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), in response to Truthout’s 17-month-old Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request, does not contain any smoking guns that would put to rest that lingering question.”
Jason Leopold, DHS Emails Question Federal Law Enforcement’s Role in Violence at Occupy Wall Street and
Oakland Rallies, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 28 2013), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/15389-newly-released-dhsemails-questions-federal-law-enforcements-role-in-violence-at-ows-rallies-in-oakland-and-new-york.
76

Ellen Nakashima, Clarity Sought on Electronics Searches Travelers’ Devices Seized at Border, WASH. POST,
Feb. 7, 2008.
77

After the case was filed, CBP provided most of the documents sought; the plaintiffs continued their challenge
seeking additional information, but lost. Asian Law Caucus v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 4:08-cv00842, 2008 WL 5047839 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008) (granting the government summary judgment).
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made an appearance in several federal court opinions in criminal cases, 78 the Post story made a
real splash; laptop searches became newly salient for both civil rights groups and Congress. The
matter was pressed, for example, at a Senate Judiciary subcommittee hearing titled “Laptop
Searches and Other Violations of Privacy Faced by Americans Returning from Overseas
Travel.” 79 Bills were introduced, 80 reports written, 81 FOIA requests submitted, 82 objections
elaborated, 83 and affirmative lawsuits filed. 84
In the middle of the controversy, DHS released materials on the extant policy and the
prevalence of electronic device border searches. The released information showed that CBP
policy allowed border officials to search (and copy) the contents of laptops and cell-phones of
any traveler—U.S. citizen or foreign national—undergoing border inspection, with or without
suspicion. CBP also released information on the prevalence of laptop and cell-phone searches:
such searches occurred at a rate of 250 per month in the months of 2008-2009 covered by the
disclosure 85: miniscule as a percentage of travelers but still large as a number. Advocates and
Congress were not satisfied by this information and kept the issue alive into the new
administration, asking the new Secretary to review and revise the policy. On August 27, 2009,
78

See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 274 F.3d 1007, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d
501, 502-03 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Arnold,
454 F.Supp.2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d 533 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008).
79

Laptop Searches and Other Violations of Privacy Faced by Americans Returning from Overseas Travel:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Const. Subcomm., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Jayson P. Ahern,
Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
80

See Electronic Device Privacy Act of 2008, H.R. 6588, 110th Cong. (2008); Securing Our Borders and Our
Data Act of 2008, H.R. 6702, 110th Cong. (2008); Securing our Borders and our Data Act of 2009, H.R. 239, 111th
Cong.) (2009); Border Security Search Accountability Act of 2008, H.R. 6869, 110th Cong. (2008); Border Security
Search Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 1726, 111th Cong. (2009); Comprehensive Immigration Reform ASAP Act
of 2009, H.R. 4321, 111th Cong. (2009); Travelers’ Device Privacy Protection Act of 2008, S. 3612, 110th Cong.
(2008); Travelers’ Device Privacy Protection Act of 2008, H.R. 7118, 110th Cong. (2008).
81

ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, RETURNING HOME: HOW U.S. GOVERNMENT PRACTICES UNDERMINE CIVIL RIGHTS AT
OUR NATION’S DOORSTEP (April 2009), available at http://www.advancingjustice-alc.org/sites/asian-lawcaucus/files/Returning%20Home.pdf/; MUSLIM ADVOCATES: UNREASONABLE INTRUSIONS: AMERICANS RETURNING
HOME SEARCHED AND INTERROGATED ABOUT POLITICS, FAITH & FINANCES (April 2009), available at
http://www.muslimadvocates.org/americans_returning_home_searched_interrogated_about_politics_faith_finances;
YULE KIM, BORDER SEARCHES OF LAPTOP COMPUTERS AND OTHER ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICES 3 (Cong.
Research Serv., RL34404, 2009). Later advocacy reports included CONSTITUTION PROJECT, SUSPICIONLESS BORDER
SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES: LEGAL AND PRIVACY CONCERNS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY’S POLICY (May 18, 2011), available at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Border_Search_of_Electronic_Devices_0518_2011.pdf;
82

See Letter from Catherine Crump, ACLU Staff Attorney, to Mark Hanson, FOIA Director, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/freespeech/laptopfoia.pdf.
83

See, e.g., ACLU Seeks Records About Laptop Searches at the Border, ACLU (June 10, 2009),
http://www.aclu.org/free-speech/aclu-seeks-records-about-laptop-searches-border.
84

See Abidor v. Napolitano, 1:10-cv-04059 (E.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 7, 2010); House v. Napolitano, 1:11-cv-10852
(D. Mass. filed May 13, 2011), 2012 WL 1038816 (D. Mass. 2012).
85

See Laptop Search Analysis, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/nationalsecurity/laptop-search-analysis. I used this table to compute the average:
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/laptopsearch/Tab_24_Chart_with_formulas_08182010.xls.
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DHS announced new policies for both CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE). 86 Unlike the old policies, which had only been made public after substantial dispute, the
new policies were immediately posted on the Department’s website. They were a bit more
constraining than the versions they replaced. In particular, they included timeframes, banned
detention of devices after searches were complete, required device owners be provided
information on appeal rights, and added supervisory review. They did not, however, add a
suspicion prerequisite for searches. In addition, the Secretary instructed CRCL to conduct a
“Civil Liberties Impact Assessment” within 120 days, a deadline of December 2009.
Program Review. A “Civil Liberties Impact Assessment” is a report. The phrase calls to
mind the Environmental Impact Assessments required by the National Environment Policy Act
of 1969, 87 and the Privacy Impact Assessments required by the E-Government Act, 88 but
whereas EIAs and PIAs have become institutionalized, analogues in other arenas have not. 89 As
of August 2009, CRCL had completed just four earlier Civil Liberties Impact Assessments. 90
The concept of an impact assessment is to systematically examine both the risks posed by a
planned or ongoing process, and costs and benefits of potential strategies for amelioration of
those risks. 91 This new electronic device searching impact assessment, the first started in the
new administration, was not quickly forthcoming. In fact, it was not completed until December
2011, twenty months later than the Secretary had directed. And it was not immediately made
public; although its completion was noted in a quarterly report to Congress, 92 even a bare

86

DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES CONTAINING INFORMATION, CBP
Directive No. 3340-049 (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cbp_directive_3340-049.pdf; DEPT. OF
HOMELAND SEC., BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES, ICE Directive No. 7-6.1 (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ice_border_search_electronic_devices.pdf.
87

National Environment Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190 § 102(2)(C), 83 Stat. 852, 853 (1970), codified as
amended as 42 U.S.C. § 432(c).
88

See OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, M-03-22, GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY PROVISIONS OF THE EGOVERNMENT ACT OF 2002 (2003) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda_m03-22 (“Privacy
Impact Assessment (PIA) is an analysis of how information is handled: (i) to ensure handling conforms to applicable
legal, regulatory, and policy requirements regarding privacy, (ii) to determine the risks and effects of collecting,
maintaining and disseminating information in identifiable form in an electronic information system, and (iii) to
examine and evaluate protections and alternative processes for handling information to mitigate potential privacy
risks.”).
89

The idea of a civil liberties impact assessment seems to have made its first appearance in CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, SECURING AMERICA, PROTECTING OUR FREEDOMS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 14-15 (2005) available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=474133. See also Jonathan H. Marks, 9/11 + 3/11
+ 7/7 = ? What Counts in Counterterrorism, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 559, 609-24 (2006). As Marks points
out, a proposal for a Human Rights Impact Assessment process in public health policy formulation was made over a
decade earlier. Lawrence Gostin & Jonathan Mann, Toward the Development of a Human Rights Impact
Assessment for the Formulation and Evaluation of Public Health Policies, 1 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 58 (1994),
available at http:// www.hsph.harvard.edu/fxbcenter/V1N1gostin.htm.
90

See Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Impact Assessments, DEPT. HOMELAND SEC. http://www.dhs.gov/civilrights-civil-liberties-impact-assessments (last visited on Aug. 13, 2013).
91

Gostin, supra note 89, at 61.

92

See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES Q. REP. FY2012, Q3 (Oct. 3,
2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/crcl-quarterly-report-fy-2012-q3_0.pdf. The
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executive summary was not posted until over a year later, in January 2013. 93 The to-be-expected
FOIA request quickly followed, 94 and in June 2013 DHS released a full version, albeit with legal
analysis redacted. 95
The Impact Assessment—by this time titled a “Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Impact
Assessment”—took the position that suspicionless laptop searches by border agents did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. In this it lined up with all the Court of Appeals precedent extant
at the time the document was completed. 96 (Between completion and release, the Ninth Circuit
held, en banc, that forensic laptop searches, but not non-forensic searches, had to be justified by
reasonable suspicion. 97 More on that decision below.) Even though CRCL found no
constitutional violations, the Impact Assessment nonetheless made five recommendations:
•

•

•

Record a reason for each search. “CBP officers who decide to conduct a device search
generally should record the reason for the search in a TECS [computer system] field. To
be clear, we are not recommending that officers demonstrate reasonable suspicion for the
device search; rather we recommend that officers simply record the actual reason they are
conducting the search, whatever that reason is. This recommendation exceeds
constitutional requirements, but should facilitate CBP’s operational supervision and
oversight.”
Explicitly ban race, religion, and ethnicity discrimination in searches, subject to
narrowly tailored exceptions. CRCL recommended that CBP and ICE should
supplement the Department’s overarching antidiscrimination policy by “stat[ing]
explicitly in policy that it is generally impermissible for officers to discriminate against
travelers—including by singling them out for specially rigorous searching—because of
their actual or perceived race, religion, or ethnicity, and that officers may use race,
religion, or ethnicity as a factor in conducting discretionary device searches only when
(a) the search is based on information (such as a suspect description) specific to an
incident, suspect, or ongoing criminal activity, or (b) limited to situations in which
Component leadership has found such consideration temporarily necessary based on their
assessment of intelligence information and risk, because alternatives do not meet security
needs.”
Collect data and conduct analysis of racial/ethnic disparate impact. “CBP should
improve monitoring of the distribution of electronic device searching by race and

report states that the Impact Assessment was completed in August 2012, id. at 8, but the report, when released, was
dated December 2011.
93

See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, BORDER SEARCHES OF
ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/crcl-border-search-impactassessment_01-29-13_1.pdf.
94

See FOIA Request Letter from Catherine Crump, ACLU, to Fernando Pineiro, DHS FOIA Officer (Feb. 8,
2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/dhs_border_search_report_foia.pdf.
95

See DHS FOIA Response (2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/crcl-border-searchimpact-assessment_06-03-13_1.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
96

See sources cited supra note 78.

97

United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
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•

•

ethnicity, by conducting routine analysis to “assess whether travelers of any particular
ethnicity . . . at any port of entry are being chosen for electronic device searches in
substantial disproportion to that ethnicity’s portion of all travelers through the port. . . .
Data and results should be shared with CRCL.”
Remedy any detected disparate impact. If analysis suggests “that electronic device
searching in any port has a substantial unexplained skew towards travelers of one or more
ethnicity, CBP should work with CRCL on developing appropriate oversight
mechanisms. Subsequent steps generally should include a requirement of supervisory
approval for searches (absent exigent circumstances) or enhanced training, and may
include other responses.”
Improve notice of redress avenues. “CBP should improve the notice given to travelers
subjected to electronic device searches by updating tear sheets to refer travelers to DHS
TRIP [Travelers Redress Inquiry Program] if they seek redress.” The assessment noted
that TRIP’s intake categories were correspondingly expanded, to allow complainants to
reference not just discrimination but also abusive or coercive screening and free
speech/free press violations.

CBP, the posted summary noted, had agreed to carry out each recommendation.
Civil liberties advocates were far from happy with the Impact Assessment. The ACLU,
for example, described it as “disappointing” and its logic as “faulty.” 98 Arguing in favor of a
reasonable suspicion standard for border searches in terms that were not limited to electronic
devices, 99 it summarized: “Even at the border, the Fourth Amendment requires more than just
hunches. It is disappointing that the DHS watchdog dedicated to protecting our privacy and
other civil liberties does not recognize that.” The blogosphere ridiculed the project of an
internally-conducted impact assessment as illegitimate (“What else would you expect them to
say?” 100), and commenters questioned the bona fides of CRCL, describing it as an “Orwellian”101
office that “probably functions more like an entity tasked with creating and promoting the legal
justification for programs that violate laws or civil liberties.” 102
98

Brian Hauss, DHS Releases Disappointing Civil Liberties Report on Border Searches of Laptops and Other
Electronics, ACLU (June 5, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-immigrants-rights-nationalsecurity/dhs-releases-disappointing-civil.
99

The ACLU’s blog post on the topic noted, for example, “To be sure, rummaging around through people’s
personal papers may well turn up the occasional bad guy, but that is not the only consideration.” Id. Of course, the
government’s authority to “rummage[e] around through people’s personal papers” without any suspicion at all, if
that rummaging is during a border inspection, is established. See, e.g., United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 100304 (9th Cir. 2008) (summarizing cases upholding suspicionless searches of personal papers and effects during border
inspections).
100

Mike Masnick, Homeland Security: Not Searching Your Laptop Doesn’t Benefit Your Civil Liberties, So We
Can Do It, TECHDIRT (Feb. 11, 2013, 8:51 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130208/17415621927/homeland-security-not-searching-your-laptop-doesntbenefit-your-civil-liberties-so-we-can-do-it.shtml.
101

Id.

102

Kevin Gosztola, DHS Finds Suspicionless Border Searches Do Not Violate Americans’ Civil Liberties, THE
DISSENTER (Feb. 8, 2013, 4:14 PM), http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2013/02/08/dhs-finds-suspicionless-bordersearches-do-not-violate-americans-civil-liberties/.
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Lending credibility to the critics’ complaints was the Cotterman decision by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, en banc. In a decision rendered during the writing of the
impact assessment, a 9th Circuit panel had agreed with the United States in a child pornography
prosecution that no individualized suspicion was necessary to justify a border inspection laptop
search. 103 A few months after completion of the assessment, however, though long before its
release, the Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc, 104 and in March 2013, reversed on this
point. 105 Forensic searches, the en banc court held, were far more intrusive than non-forensic
examinations of electronic devices or of, say, luggage: “It is as if a search of a person’s suitcase
could reveal not only what the bag contained on the current trip, but everything it had ever
carried.” 106 Accordingly, such searches were lawful under the Fourth Amendment only if
supported by individualized “reasonable suspicion.”
CRCL released the very short executive summary without fanfare—indeed, without any
notice or background at all. The same is true for the FOIA-prompted release of the entire report,
months later. Any announcement would no doubt have emphasized the five recommendations in
the impact assessment, and that each had been adopted by DHS. In any event, there was
essentially no public discussion of those recommendations; coverage of the release in blogs and
the press was entirely dominated by the civil rights and civil liberties community’s displeasure
with the reasonable suspicion conclusion. This is true even though those recommendations gave
the advocacy groups a great deal that they had previously sought, which might have been
advantageously celebrated and even built upon in additional areas. The rule that CBP officers
“record the reason” for any electronic device search went some distance, though not all the way,
to a requirement that there be reasonable suspicion—yet this aspect of the report got no attention.
The recommendation that the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program complaint form—
thousands of which are filed each year—led to modification of the options travelers can check to
include complaints about allegedly abusive searches and interviews, allowing previously
impossible monitoring of those issues. 107 Even more striking, the CRCL-recommended
articulation of a clear departmental rule against racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination in
searching was something that civil rights and civil liberties groups had sought for years. 108 And
they had similarly long proposed data collection and analysis to monitor the possibility of bias in

103

United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011).

104

United States v. Cotterman, 673 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir., Mar. 19, 2012) (granting reh’g en banc).

105

United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The en banc court held, however, that
the facts available to the searching border agents were sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, and therefore
upheld the search.
106

Id. at 959.

107

See DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES FY 2011 ANN. REP. 26 (2012)
(reporting that 10% of DHS TRIP complaints used those new checkoff boxes).
108

See, e.g., ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, RETURNING HOME: HOW U.S. GOVERNMENT PRACTICES UNDERMINE CIVIL
RIGHTS AT OUR NATION’S DOORSTEP 29 (April 2009), available at http://www.advancingjustice-alc.org/sites/asianlaw-caucus/files/Returning%20Home.pdf (“DHS ought to adopt a rule prohibiting law enforcement decisions based
on race, ethnicity, religion, and national origin while eliminating the blanket exemption for national security and
border investigations.”).
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traveler screening. 109 All this was in the impact assessment’s accepted recommendations, but
either nobody noticed, or advocates decided that they gained more from decrying the reasonable
suspicion conclusion and did not want to muddy their message by praising these other policy
changes.
C. Border Patrol and Interpretation
On May 14, 2011, Benjamin Roldan Salinas and his girlfriend, M.N., were harvesting
salal in the Olympic National Forest. (Salal is an attractive groundcover plant; people get
permits to pick it in forest service lands, and then resell it to florists. 110) A Forest Service officer
saw the couple from his car and immediately called the Border Patrol; based on his experience
with salal harvesters and their limited English, he asked Border Patrol for assistance with
Spanish-language interpretation. He then stopped the car in which the two were driving and
began to ask them questions (in English). When the Border Patrol car pulled up, both fled on
foot. Salinas jumped into the Sol Duc River and was swept away. 111 Ms. N. was arrested and
charged with an immigration violation; news reports say that she was released after 10 days. 112
Salinas was found three weeks later, dead, his body tangled in brush four miles down river. 113
The tragedy of a death increased considerably the focus by advocacy organizations on the
topic—but the issue was far from new. Advocacy groups had for some time been concerned
about Border Patrol enforcement at the northern border, arguing that it was unduly aggressive
and often discriminatory. They pointed to the fact that the number of northern Border Patrol
agents has skyrocketed, under congressional pressure, since 9/11 114; notwithstanding the small
number of attempted illegal border crossings to engage those so assigned, the number of northern
border agents in 2012 was over 2000, compared to about 300 a decade before. 115 These agents
109

See, e.g., id. (“To allow Congress and the public to monitor compliance with this rule, DHS should require
CBP officers to log the gender, race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, and nationality, as known or perceived, of
each individual subjected to secondary inspections, searches of electronic devices, or other special security measures
at each port of entry, and to report this information on an annual basis.”). Cf. RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, RACIAL
PROFILING AND THE NEED FOR DATA COLLECTION: WHAT DHS SHOULD COLLECT AND MONITOR (Nov. 2011),
available at
http://rightsworkinggroup.org/sites/default/files/Data%20Collection%20Recommendations%20for%20DHS.PDF
(urging racial data collection in the different context of immigration enforcement, as well.
110

See Salal Permit Sales to Begin at Olympic National Forest, USDA FOREST SERVICE (Aug. 25, 2011),
http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/olympic/news-events/?cid=STELPRDB5327177.
111

The facts in this paragraph are taken from [Redacted] USDA Complaint Final Agency Decision, FS-11-5171,
28 (Apr. 28, 2012), available at
http://nwirp.org/Documents/PressReleases/DecisionOfOASCRUSDAreCivilRightsComplaintREDACTEDforReleas
e.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
112

See Lornet Turnbull & Roberto Daza, Climate of Fear Grips Forks Illegal Immigrants, SEATTLE TIMES, June
26, 2011, at 1; William Yardley, In Far Northwest, A New Border Focus on Latinos, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2012, at
A1.
113

Turnbull, supra note 112.

114

See CHAD HADDAL, CONG. RES. SERV., RL32562, BORDER SECURITY: THE ROLE OF THE U.S. BORDER
PATROL, 22 (Aug. 11, 2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32562.pdf.
115

Just six weeks after 9/11, the USA PATRIOT Act authorized a tripling of Border Patrol personnel assigned to
the northern border, from its 2001 allotment of 340. By 2005, the number assigned had reached over 1000. Then in
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spend a good deal of their time collaborating with local law enforcement, and advocacy
organizations reported that much of this collaboration was initiated as calls by local law
enforcement for language assistance. (All Border Patrol agents are required to speak functional
Spanish. 116) Once Border Patrol was on the scene, enforcement interviews and often
immigration arrests frequently followed.
Advocacy and community organizations complained that the practice violated the civil
rights of their clients and participants. For agencies that receive federal financial assistance—
which is to say, nearly every law enforcement agency 117—the argument was founded on Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Among other things, Title VI forbids national origin
discrimination by federally supported organizations; in the 1974 case of Lau v. Nichols, the
Supreme Court held that this ban covers language discrimination as well. (Indeed, the Court said
in Lau, the challenged implementing regulation’s requirement that recipients take “affirmative
steps to rectify . . . language deficiency” was permissible under Title VI. Across the
government, Title VI regulations have similar provisions.) So the argument is a simple one: the
use of Border Patrol agents as interpreters by federally supported police departments is
inappropriate, because it subjects Spanish-speakers to law enforcement inquiry and potential
immigration consequences not faced by others, constituting language discrimination and a failure
to provide appropriate language access.
Outreach and its uses. Just days after Mr. Salinas’s body was found, a leading advocacy
organization highlighted the issue in an email to CRCL staff, setting out allegations related to
two different incidents—Mr. Salinas was referred to only obliquely. The complaints led to a
meeting between CRCL and Border Patrol in June 2011, “on the topic of provision of
interpretive services and how to avoid having it chill immigrant calls to police, etc.”
Documented in the response to a FOIA request, the email and an accompanying memo
summarizing the meeting’s resolution state that CBP and CRCL agreed to explore CBP use of
“musters [in-service training statements] or other relatively low-key guidance.” CBP was to
coordinate with CRCL on “a draft guidance or muster on the topic of avoiding harm to
community policing/victims/witnesses when providing assistance with language
interpretation.” 118 The pressure from advocates and community groups was noted: “This is
2006, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act required that 20% of the Border Patrol’s annual
increases in manpower be assigned to the northern border. P.L. 108-458. In FY 2010 and subsequent years, the
number of Border Patrol agents was over 2,200. See UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL, BORDER PATROL AGENT
STAFFING BY FISCAL YEAR (OCT. 1ST THROUGH SEPT. 30TH),
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/usbp_fy12_stats/staffing_1993_
2012.ctt/staffing_1993_2012.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
116

See FAQs – Working for Border Patrol, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/careers/customs_careers/border_careers/bp_agent/faqs_working_for_the_usbp.xml#Jo
bRequirements (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
117

For an index to all the recipients of federal financial assistance from the Department of Justice alone, see OJP
Grant Awards, DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, http://grants.ojp.usdoj.gov:85/selector/main (last
visited Aug. 18, 2013).
118

See Memorandum from [redacted], Immigration Section Policy Advisor, for Meeting Participants (July 29,
2011), in 8/22/2012 DHS OCRCL FOIA RESPONSE 90-91,
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/911_FOIA_Response.pdf.
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becoming a hotter topic by the day, and we really need to figure out an appropriately robust
response. 119
It is worth noting that under the Title VI theory, the civil rights violator is not the Border
Patrol but rather the agency that calls Border Patrol. It is the agency that places that phone call
that is allegedly breaching its language access obligations, discriminating against Spanish
speakers; Border Patrol may be facilitating this breach, but it is not itself discriminating. The
result is that CRCL’s jurisdiction over the Border Patrol interpretation issue was far from
exclusive. The Department of Justice provides financial support for a high percentage of the
nation’s law enforcement agencies, and therefore has Title VI authority. And the Department of
Justice’s civil rights offices (both the Office of Justice Programs’ Office of Civil Rights, and the
Civil Rights Division’s Federal Coordination and Compliance Section) face a very different
environment than does CRCL with respect to CBP operational activities. The political and
relational realities that make it difficult for an internal agency office to find another agency
office’s conduct problematic are bound to be lessened in a situation in which the complainedabout conduct is mostly conducted by another agency. I analyze in Part II the ways in which the
potential involvement of a sister agency value-based ally, such as the Department of Justice,
affects the hand of an office such as CRCL. Here, I will simply note that the FOIA’d documents
demonstrate that the potential for Justice Department involvement was clearly in the minds of the
actors. 120
Complaint investigation. Immigrant rights advocates took advantage of the overlapping
jurisdictional issue just a few days later; in July 2011, Ms. N (Mr. Salinas’s girlfriend) filed a
complaint, not with DHS, but with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), of which the
Forest Service is a component. Because Mr. Salinas’s death was after an encounter with a
federal—“federally conducted,” in the language of federal civil rights offices, not “federally
supported”—law enforcement agency, Title VI does not apply. But, represented by the
Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, Ms. N.’s complaint argued that the Forest Service officer’s
actions constituted race and national origin discrimination, in violation of USDA’s
antidiscrimination regulation 121 and Executive Order 13166, which has since 2000 forbidden
federal agencies to discriminate against people with limited English proficiency. NWIRP’s
argument was twofold. First, just as under Title VI, NWIRP argued that use of Border Patrol as
interpreters was inappropriate, because it subjected Spanish-speakers to law enforcement inquiry
and potential immigration consequences not faced by others stopped by Forest Service officers.
119

See E-mail from Margo Schlanger, then DHS Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, to Ronald D.
Vitiello, Deputy Chief, Border Patrol (July 28, 2011, 7:57 AM), in 8/22/2012 DHS OCRCL FOIA RESPONSE, supra
note 118, at 86-87.
120

See Memorandum from [redacted], Immigration Section Policy Advisor, for Meeting Participants (July 29,
2011), supra note 118, at 91 (“She and Officer Schlanger also discussed the role of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
in enforcing these laws, and the recently-circulated draft DOJ Frequently Asked Questions . . .”).
121

7 C.F.R. § 15(d) (“No agency, officer, or employee of the United States Department of Agriculture shall, on
the ground of race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, marital status, familial status, sexual orientation, or
disability, or because all of part of an individual’s income is derived from any public assistance program, exclude
from participation in, deny the benefits of, or subject to discrimination any person in the United States under any
program or activity conducted by the United States Department of Agriculture.”).
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Second, NWIRP claimed, that use was pretextual, a cover for hostility towards Hispanics or
perhaps for the arresting Forest Service Officer’s interest in immigration enforcement, which
should not have been his concern. The complaint included strong evidence on both theories,
including an email sent on June 8, 2011, by the Forest Service Officer who was the subject of the
complaint to several individuals complaining that in the aftermath of the incident, a community
member was watching his house. A Border Patrol Officer on the email chain responded, “The
great thing would be to request translation assistance so that we are able to sack this guy up.” As
the USDA Office of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights later noted, “The implication of this
email was that the practice of requesting interpretation assistance is a guise for initiating an
immigration enforcement action. . . . The tone of this email clearly implied that this was a standing
practice between FSO [the Forest Service Officer] and BP [Border Patrol].” 122
Complaining to USDA was a savvy piece of advocacy by NWIRP. USDA’s civil rights
office is not just an Office of Goodness—it is uniquely empowered, among federal civil rights
offices. Its operative regulation was promulgated by the Clinton Administration in 1999 123 just
after the Department settled a mammoth fair-lending case to remedy generations of
discrimination against African-American farmers. 124 That regulation granted the USDA Office
of the Assistant Secretary not just the authority to adjudicate complaints, but also to make “final
determinations . . . as to the corrective actions required to resolve program complain[ts].” 125 So
unlike CRCL, which is authorized only to make recommendations to the Secretary and DHS
offices, and required then to report to Congress those recommendations and the agency
response, 126 USDA’s civil rights office, led by a Senate-confirmed Assistant Secretary for Civil
Rights, has the regulatory authority to direct other USDA offices what to do. 127 That authority
122

[Redacted] USDA Complaint Final Agency Decision, FS-11-5171, 28 (Apr. 28, 2012), available at
http://nwirp.org/Documents/PressReleases/DecisionOfOASCRUSDAreCivilRightsComplaintREDACTEDforReleas
e.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
123

See Nondiscrimination in USDA Conducted Programs and Activities, 64 Fed. Ref. 66,709 (Nov. 30, 1999)
(amending 7 C.F.R. § 15d (1999)); Nondiscrimination in USDA Conducted Programs and Activities, 63 Fed. Reg.
62,962 (Nov. 10, 1998) (amending 7 C.F.R. § 15d (1998)); Nondiscrimination in USDA Conducted Programs and
Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,851 (Apr. 23, 1996) (amending 15 C.F.R. § 15d (1996)).
124

See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999). See also TADLOCK COWAN & JODY FEDER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS20430, THE PIGFORD CASES: USDA SETTLEMENT OF DISCRIMINATION SUITS BY BLACK
FARMERS (2012), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS20430.pdf.
125

The regulation has what looks like two corresponding scriveners errors. It reads: “The Director of the Office
of Civil Rights will make final determinations as to the merits of complaints under this part and as to the corrective
actions required to resolve program complainants. The complaint will be notified of the final determination on his
or her complaint.” 7 C.F.R. § 15d.4(b) (emphasis added). It seems clear the two emphasized words should have
been switched. See also 7 C.F.R. 288(a)(13) (authorizing the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights to “make final
determinations on both the merits and required corrective action” for program complaints).
126

See 6 U.S.C. § 345; 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1.

127

I do not mean to take a position on the essentially hypothetical issue whether the Secretary would be
empowered to instruct the Assistant Secretary how to use this regulatory authority. This is the analogue of the
longstanding administrative law argument about the extent of presidential authority over decisions by executive
branch officials. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2250-51 & nn. 8 & 9
(2001) (citing scholarship on both sides of the question, and taking a position “accept[ing] Congress’s broad power
to insulate administrative activity from the President, but argu[ing] that Congress has left more power in presidential
hands than generally is recognized”).
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seems not to be very often asserted (and was not utilized at all in the Bush administration), but it
continues to exist.128
Over the next months, as the USDA investigation moved along, the advocacy community
worked to bolster its point of view by preparing two in-depth reports, each combining
sympathetic facts, a rights-based frame, and policy argumentation. 129 The issue remained a live
one at DHS, but the guidance mentioned in the memo summarizing the June 2011 meeting did
not issue. Indeed, in April 2012, there is evidence that CRCL at least considered seeking formal
legal advice from the DHS Office of the General Counsel on the issue. 130 In May, nine months
after filing its USDA complaint, NWIRP took another step to increase inter-agency pressure on
DHS, filing another complaint, this time with the Department of Justice and the Department of
Homeland Security, on behalf of five new complainants as well as (again) M.N. Each of the
complainants had been stopped by non-immigration law enforcement, who called Border Patrol
to help with interpretation. In each case, the Border Patrol agent who responded then questioned
the complainant about his or her immigration status; several of them were put into immigration
proceedings as a result. The theory of this complaint was the same as for the Forest Service
complaint, except with a Title VI jurisdictional hook:
We therefore believe that the interpretation/translation assistance justification is being
used to cover a pattern of discriminatory enforcement activity that the agents themselves
appear to realize is problematic. Hence, they report that their involvement was as a result
of a request for interpretation assistance. The inescapable conclusion is that the actual or
pretextual use of Border Patrol agents for interpretation assistance by law enforcement
agencies is resulting in outright discrimination in one of two ways: 1) to the extent that it
is really about language access, it constitutes impermissible discrimination because the
price of such access for a segment of the LEP population is enduring questioning about
citizenship and immigration status (and detention and deportation for some); or 2) to the
extent that it is simply a pretext in cases where law enforcement agencies are calling in
Border Patrol without justification, it is of course a different, but no less pernicious, form
of discrimination. In either case, the practice violates civil rights protections. 131

128

See USDA, Civil Rights at USDA: A Backgrounder on Efforts by the Obama Administration,
http://www.usda.gov/documents/USDA%20Civil%20Rights%20Background.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013). See
also Reports of Civil Rights Complaints, Resolutions, and Actions, USDA, http://www.ascr.usda.gov/reports.html
(last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
129

See SARAH CURRY ET AL., One America and the Univ. of Washington Center for Human Rights, THE
GROWING HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS ALONG WASHINGTON’S NORTHERN BORDER (Apr. 17, 2012), available at
https://www.weareoneamerica.org/sites/weareoneamerica.org/files/REPORT_northernborder-FINAL.pdf; LISA
GRAYBILL, Am. Immigration Council, BORDER PATROL AGENTS AS INTERPRETERS ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER:
UNWISE POLICY, ILLEGAL PRACTICE (Sept. 12, 2012), available at http://www.ilw.com/articles/2012,0927graybill.pdf.
130

See Draft Memorandum from Tamara Kessler for Audrey Anderson, in 8/22/2012 DHS OCRCL FOIA
RESPONSE, supra note 118, at 10.
131

Letter from Jorge Barón, Executive Director, Northwestern Immigrant Rights Project, Elizabeth Hawkins,
Attorney, Bean Porter Hawkins PLLC, and Wendy Hernandez, Attorney, Hernandez Immigration Law, to Eric
Holder, Attorney General, and Janet Napolitano, DHS Secretary 8 (May 1, 2012), available at

27
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/91

28

Schlanger:
Schlanger, Offices of Goodness. DRAFT (September 9, 2013) .

The May 1 complaint sought intervention by the Department of Justice, whose Civil
Rights Division coordinates Title VI and Executive Order 13166 enforcement across the
government, and whose Office of Justice Programs has the lead role in Title VI enforcement
involving law enforcement agencies that have received funding from the Department of Justice.
The complaint requested two DOJ statements: the first, to local law enforcement and the second
to federal law enforcement, that use of Border Patrol agents as interpreters violates Title VI and
Executive Order 13166 obligations, respectively. In addition, NWIRP asked DHS to terminate
removal proceedings for anyone facing immigration consequences as a result of a request for
interpretation by Border Patrol agents.
The USDA Office of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights issued a formal finding
against the U.S. Forest Service on May 31, 2012, declaring, after comprehensive analysis, that
Forest Service use of Border Patrol agents to provide interpretation services constituted national
origin discrimination and also that the language access issue was being used was a pretext for
discrimination against Latinos. Over the evident opposition of the Forest Service, the Final
Agency Decision closed with an “Order of Relief,” which included an instruction to the Forest
Service to develop a language access plan that relied on neutral interpreters, not Border Patrol
agents. 132 This order went much further than the hypothetical Border Patrol guidance discussed
within DHS nearly a year before; that was described in the FOIA’d email as guidance about
“avoiding harm to community policing/victims/witnesses when providing assistance with
language interpretation” whereas the USDA order simply banned, altogether, language assistance
coordination with Border Patrol.
This episode highlights, in particular, the cross-agency dynamics involved in the work of
an Office of Goodness. The USDA’s finding of discrimination was an important victory for the
advocacy groups, ratifying their legal approach to the Border Patrol interpretation issue. But
they still did not have what they really wanted, because the USDA decision covered only the
Forest Service. To cover state and local law enforcement calls to Border Patrol would require
either an authoritative ruling by the Department of Justice (governing the obligations of these
federally supported agencies) or a policy change by the Border Patrol. It took another six
months, but on November 21, 2012, CBP promulgated “Guidance on Providing Language
Assistance to Other Law Enforcement Organizations,” which instructed Border Patrol offices not
to agree to requests from non-DHS law enforcement agencies seeking “CBP assistance based
solely on a need for language translation.” Instead, “absent any other circumstances, those

http://nwirp.org/Documents/PressReleases/ComplaintToUSDOJandDHSreInterpretationAssistanceFinalRedacted0501-2012.pdf. See also id. at 2:
“As the Border Patrol agents are preparing to depart, the WSP trooper thanks them and has the following
exchange with the agents:
• WSP Trooper: ‘Well, I appreciate you coming out.’
• BP Agent: ‘No problem, give us a call anytime.’
• WSP Trooper: ‘Oh yeah, well, we like to, we just have to do it in a roundabout sort of way.’
• BP Agent: ‘That’s fine, that’s great, we have no problem with that. We appreciate the calls.’”
132

[Redacted] USDA Complaint Final Agency Decision, supra note 122, at 35.
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requests should be referred” to interpreters. 133 The policy was distributed to relevant groups—
including NWIRP—about two weeks later. 134
Training. Finally, once the policy was announced, CRCL did outreach to affected local
law enforcement agencies, offering them materials 135 and training about alternatives to their
prior reliance on Border Patrol for language assistance. 136 I surmise that these activities assisted
Border Patrol in its need to preserve good relations with local law enforcement, in part by
improving local capacity but in part by suggesting that the denial of language assistance was
attributable not to Border Patrol’s own preferences but because of civil rights imperatives.
D. The NCTC AG Guidelines
On March 22, 2012, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence announced a
major change to federal information sharing policy. New guidelines replaced rules announced in
2008, and now permit the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to obtain and retain large
federal governmental datasets that contain mostly non-terrorism information about U.S. citizens
for up to five years, in order to facilitate repeated “pattern-based” computer queries and analysis
designed to identify terrorism information. It is up to each federal agency from which NCTC
requests databases to negotiate terms—including whether a shorter time frame is appropriate.
Previously NCTC was allowed to hold onto these kinds of datasets only for 180 days—enough
time to process the data, but not to simply put it into storage on the chance that it might later
prove useful. In addition, the prior permitted uses of pattern analysis were narrower. 137
This all sounds technical but is actually not. As far as public information indicated, the
new guidelines constituted a sea change in federal governmental surveillance of U.S. residents
and citizens. Just about everything any part of the federal government knows about anyone is
now potentially available for five years of big-data-mining by federal counterterrorism
authorities. (We know now that similar data-ingestion and data-mining techniques were being
used by other agencies, too, 138 but that information became public much later, and is beyond this
133

Memorandum from David V. Aguilar, CBP Deputy Commissioner for CBP Officers (Nov. 21, 2012)
(available at http://foiarr.cbp.gov/streamingWord.asp?i=1233 (last visited Aug. 17, 2013)).
134

Press Release, Northwest Immigrants Rights Project, Breaking News: Border Patrol Policy Change Important
Victory for Border Communities (Dec. 13, 2013) (available at http://www.nwirp.org/news/viewmediarelease/49
(last visited Aug. 17, 2013)).
135

See LEP Resource Guide for Law Enforcement, DHS OCRCL, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/lep-resouce-guide-law-enforcement_0.pdf (last visited Aug. 17,
2013).
136

See CRCL Provides Language Access Technical Assistance to Law Enforcement, DHS (Feb. 2013),
http://www.dhs.gov/crcl-provides-language-access-technical-assistance-law-enforcement.
137

For a defense of the new rules in civil liberties terms, see OFFICE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, CIVIL LIBERTIES
AND PRIVACY OFFICE, INFORMATION PAPER: DESCRIPTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
INCORPORATED IN THE UPDATED NCTC GUIDELINES (Jan. 2013), available at
http://nctc.gov/docs/CLPO_Information_Paper_on_NCTC_AG_Guidelines_-_1-22-13.pdf (last visited Aug. 17,
2013).
138

See Barton Gellman, U.S. Surveillance Architecture Includes Collection of Revealing Internet, Phone
Metadata, WASH. POST, June 15, 2013, at A1; Ellen Nakashima et al., New Documents Reveal Parameters of NSA’s
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Article’s purview.) Yet although privacy advocates and bloggers tried to fan the flames, public
response to the NCTC AG guidelines change was short lived. The New York Times ran a front
page story, devoting some space to the “civil-liberties concerns among privacy advocates.” But
those concerns somehow didn’t catch on. Blog posts like “The National Counterterrorism Center
Just Declared All of Us Domestic Terrorists” 139 got little traction. Civil liberties have a limited
constituency, 140 and with so little to gain, politically, perhaps Democrats in Congress were
reluctant to make this an issue on which they would fight the Administration. 141 (Subsequent
NSA revelations seem to be changing this political calculus.)
Working groups. Nine months after the NCTC guidelines were issued, a story in the Wall
Street Journal by investigative reporter Julia Angwin revealed a much more sustained record of
dissent within the government. Based on both reporting and FOIA’d documents, which she
posted, Angwin’s story revealed that CRCL and the DHS Privacy Office had opposed the
eventually adopted changes over the course of a full year. The documents include staff emails
starting February 2011 discussing recommended language, talking points, and briefing memos.
The discussions and work was conducted via a working group, denominated the “Internal
Records Working Group,” 142 or occasionally “DHS/NCTC Records Working Group.” 143 It
evidently including staff from numerous DHS offices—the Office of Intelligence & Analysis,
Privacy, CRCL, the Office of the General Counsel, the Office of Policy, and relevant operational
components. 144 It seems that the working group was able to develop one shared DHS set of
suggestions about the NCTC guidelines. 145 But these met with substantial resistance outside the
Secret Surveillance Programs, WASH. POST, June 20, 2013, at A1; Charlie Savage, N.S.A. Said to Search Content of
Messages to and From U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2013, at A1; Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British
Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST, June 6, 2013,
at A1; Charlie Savage, Senate Panel Presses N.S.A. on Phone Logs, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2013, at A1; In re
Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (U.S. Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, Docket 105B(g) 07-01 (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/105bg-07-01-rbw-signed-order-130715.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
139

Marcy Wheeler, The National Counterterrorism Center Just Declared All of Us Domestic Terrorists,
EMPTYWHEEL (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.emptywheel.net/2012/03/23/the-national-counterterrorism-center-justdeclared-all-of-us-domestic-terrorists/.
140

See, e.g., AMY B. ZEGART, EYES ON SPIES: CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
72-82 (2011) (discussing the low level of “voter attention to the bureaucratic details of intelligence agencies”, and
finding that “intelligence has fewer and weaker interest groups than almost any other policy area”).
141

See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312
(2006).
142

See, e.g., Email from an Intelligence Operations Specialist at the Office of Intelligence & Analysis to Rebecca
Richards and Others (Feb. 29, 2012), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE 43,
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/526365-dhs-interim-responsecontent.html#document/p347/a83505 (last
visited Aug. 17, 2013).
143

E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (May 12, 2011, 12:52 PM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 142,
at 148.
144

See E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (Feb. 29, 2012, 11:40 AM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note
142, at 55.
145

Id. See also E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (Dec. 9, 2011, 11:08 AM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE,
supra note 142, at 439 (proposing “harmonizing CRCL and OGC’s language to something both offices can get
behind”).
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Department; one email to a senior DHS lawyer from counsel’s office at the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence (ODNI) states: “We certainly value the input. However, from our
review, several of the comments tend to suggest a potential lack of understanding as to the
overarching intent of the Guidelines. Furthermore, some of the edits you have proposed would
eviscerate the authorities of the DNI and NCTC.” 146 Staff discussions were then held between
staff from DHS, ODNI, and the Department of Justice, 147 but the results are not disclosed in the
released materials.
Advice. By late spring 2011, the issues were being discussed, repeatedly, at the agency
leadership level rather than only by staff. A (redacted) May 12, 2011 memo to the Secretary
from me, as CRCL’s head, and from DHS Chief Privacy Officer Mary Ellen Callahan, is titled
(clunkily) “How Best to Express the Department’s Privacy and Civil Liberties-Related Concerns
over Draft Guidelines Proposed by the Office of The Director of National Intelligence and the
National Counterterrorism Center.” 148 Disagreement continued in subsequent weeks and
months. For example, emails between a member of the Secretary’s staff and Callahan note that
Callahan “non concurred on operational examples” evidently included in some document,
because “they were complete non sequiturs, non-responsive, and did not demonstrate the
underlying issues.” 149 The Secretary’s involvement in the discussion is confirmed at several
other points, as well. 150
By this time, the dispute was solidly multi-agency (or, as they say in the federal
intelligence world, “in the interagency”). And although there is no public documentation
confirming the point, Angwin reported that Nancy Libin, the political appointee head of the
Justice Department Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties—the DOJ’s analogous Office of
Goodness—was likewise counseling against expansion of NCTC big-data authority. 151 Angwin
explained that that the proposed change was prompted by the Northwest Flight 253 “underwear
bomber,” Umar Abdul Mutallab, who tried but failed to bring down a Detroit-bound airplane on
Christmas day 2009. She summarized that at both DOJ and at DHS, privacy and civil liberties
officials “argued that the failure to catch Mr. Abdulmutallab wasn’t caused by the lack of a
suspect—he had already been flagged—but by a failure to investigate him fully. So amassing

146

See, e.g., E-mail from Matthew Kronisch to Mary Ellen Callahan & Margo Schlanger (Mar. 11, 2011, 2:44
PM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 142, at 47.
147

Id.

148

Memo from Margo Schlanger, CRCL Officer, and Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy Officer, for Secretary
Janet Napolitano (May 12, 2011), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 142, at 347.
149

E-mail from Mary Ellen Callahan to John Cohen (June 17, 2011, 9:52 AM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE,
supra note 142, at 252.
150

See E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (June 1, 2011, 2:22 PM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note
142, at 212 (referencing an “‘information sharing’ S1 meeting” (“S1” means Secretary)); E-mail from [redacted] to
Ken Hunt (July 28, 2011, 9:40 AM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note 142, at 283 (referencing “another S1
meeting coming up”). Additional information on the meeting can be found on pp. 255-265.
151

See Julia Angwin, U.S. Terrorism Agency to Tap a Vast Database of Citizens, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 13, 2012
(“At the Department of Justice, Chief Privacy Officer Nancy Libin raised concerns about whether the guidelines
could unfairly target innocent people”).
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more data about innocent people wasn’t necessarily the right solution.” 152 And the argument did
not die: after months of negotiations between DHS and NCTC, in November 2011 the civil
liberties/privacy issues were revived within DHS by the CRCL and the Privacy Office with a
new memo deemed likely to set off a “firestorm.” 153 The two offices prepared talking points for
the DHS Deputy Secretary for a March 2012 Deputies Committee 154 meeting at the White
House. The Wall Street Journal reports that Callahan was told to make her case at that
meeting, 155 but to no avail. The new rules were signed a few days later.
* * *
The four vignettes above provide the foundation for some more general thinking about
Offices of Goodness. In Part II, I canvass the tools available to them and how each one works.
III. Tools Available to Offices of Goodness.
Tools available to Offices of Goodness range along several dimensions: from the less to
more coercive; from the less to more systemic; from the preventive to responsive; and from the
internal to external. While I’m sure other tools could be added by participants or observers with
other backgrounds, I here explore a starter list, informed by the four controversies just described.
A. Preventive tools
Offices of Goodness have a variety of processes they can use to try to prevent or
ameliorate agency operations that conflict with Goodness. Here I analyze four of those
methods—inclusion in policy formulation working groups; clearance; advice; and training and
technical assistance. Each of these tools can be used in a reactive context as well, to attempt to
reduce or respond to a demonstrated problem.
(1)
Inclusion in working groups. Like any bureaucratic organizations, federal
agencies bring people together to work on projects. One important way that an Office of
Goodness can represent Goodness is by participating in such a working group. 156 There are both
risks and benefits to this approach. The risk is erosion of value commitment as the Office of
Goodness staff is carried along by the imperatives of whatever the working group’s project is—a
152

Id.
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See E-mail from Margo Schlanger to Mary Ellen Callahan (Nov. 9, 2011, 9:01 PM), in DHS INTERIM
RESPONSE, supra note 142, at 447 (“I’m not sure I’m prepared [for] the firestorm we’re about to create’); E-mail
from Mary Ellen Callahan to Margo Schlanger (Nov. 16, 2011, 4:22 PM), in DHS INTERIM RESPONSE, supra note
142, at 446 (“I don’t know that we are ever going to get consensus on this from the other signatories, but we have
the dep sec instructions”).
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The Deputies Committee is the most senior sub-cabinet meeting in the Executive Branch, bringing together
the Deputy Secretaries of the national security agencies. See NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 1
(“NSPD-1”), ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM, Feb. 13, 2001, available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
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See Angwin, supra note 151.
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For in-depth analysis of working groups in another agency and another context, see, for example, Thomas O.
McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 57, 72-88 (1991).
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risk that is particularly strong if a conflict between the project and Goodness cannot be
reconciled with technocratic adjustment or minor tweaks but rather requires some degree of
sacrifice of project efficacy. The benefit is inclusion of Goodness in group discussions as the
project develops, which can lead to various types of accommodations and changes. 157 Even if
the group discussions end in impasse, full inclusion of the Office of Goodness staff can (though
it need not) mean that the conflict is highlighted and explained to bureaucratic higher-ups,
enabling those more senior officials to either fight it out or resolve it some other way. The
NCTC AG Guidelines incident described above provides an example; the working group
negotiations described in the disclosed documents leading to, first, principals-level discussion at
DHS and, eventually a Deputies Committee resolution, albeit one rejecting the position of DHS’s
CRCL and Privacy Office.
(2)
Clearance authority. Bureaucracies produce documents, and a common control
device is a requirement of “coordination” prior to finalization of those documents. 158 But as
Pressman and Wildavsky observed in their classic study of government policy implementation,
“Telling another person to co-ordinate . . . does not tell him what to do. He does not know
whether to coerce or bargain, to exert power or secure consent.” 159 A clearance requirement is
one specific environment for this issue; clearance requirements can be more or less coercive. On
the most coercive end, an Office of Goodness could have the ability simply to bar promulgation
of a document. Such authority is usually, however, a hallmark of chain-of-command
superiority—not something that Offices of Goodness typically possess. While the agency-head
can, of course, decline to issue (or deny permission to issue) a document, one government office
ordinarily cannot authoritatively stop the issuance of a document by its sibling office. Still, it is
possible to give an office assigned a clearance role something very close to that power, by
structuring the conflict resolution procedure so that it is the operational office that needs to
“appeal” a clearance denial. This is what is described in the account above about DHS and
Occupy. If the DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis disagreed with the considered refusal of
CRCL, Privacy, or the DHS Office of the General Counsel to clear an intelligence product, the
burden was on Intelligence & Analysis to persuade the Deputy Secretary that it should be able to
issue the product. This description suggests what is, analytically, one step lower in terms of
coercion: a clearance process can allow the objecting office a chance to appeal. Least coercive is
a simple coordination requirement, in which the Office of Goodness is merely offered a chance
to attempt to persuade, but no other authority. Regardless of the impact on the document
subjected to clearance, even the softest of clearance requirements ensures that each office asked
157

See, e.g., Dickinson, Military Lawyers, supra note 26, at 18-21 (describing lawyers’ “integration with officers
and troops on the battlefield as essential to their ability to inject legal norms and values into the decision-making
process”).
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See, e.g., HERBERT KAUFMAN, RED TAPE: ITS ORIGINS, USES, AND ABUSES 49 (1977) (“Increased
participation in governmental decisions by external groups is matched by procedures to make sure that every
administrative unit inside the government also contributes its special knowledge, point of view, and sympathy for its
clientele to the final product. One method is compulsory clearance of pending decisions with every relevant
organizational unit whose jurisdiction touches on the matters under consideration.”).
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JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON B. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN
WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND; OR, WHY IT’S AMAZING THAT FEDERAL PROGRAMS WORK AT ALL, THIS
BEING A SAGA OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AS TOLD BY TWO SYMPATHETIC OBSERVERS
WHO SEEK TO BUILD MORALS ON A FOUNDATION OF RUINED HOPES 134 (1973).
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to clear is kept informed of what is going on at other government offices, which has its own
benefits.
(3)
Advice. Both working groups and clearance arrangements are ways of structuring
advice given by staff to agency decisionmakers. An important tool for any Office of Goodness is
the opportunity to give advice even in the absence of such structures. Advice-giving, both in
writing and at meetings, is a key part of the NCTC account above. And CRCL’s advice to
Border Patrol about interpretation issues is part of that story, too. Advice-giving can operate in
several ways. Office of Goodness advisors can spot or highlight issues that might otherwise be
insufficiently noticed or valued. They can advocate and perhaps persuade decisionmakers about
a particular position. If their advice is known or discoverable, they can increase the political cost
of taking a contrary position, because the decisionmaker’s choice to overrule their objection may
become public. On the other hand, if Office of Goodness advice ratifies rather than challenges
agency policy, then it can both reassure decisionmakers and reduce the potential political cost of
that policy, by providing a ready answer to objectors (“We ran this by the Office of Goodness,
and it signed off.” 160) .
(4)
Training and technical assistance. Training is often the first response of an
organization faced with a compliance problem. Work about equal employment opportunity
training suggests that several reasons for its preferred status. Implementation of a training
program allows an organization to signal its Goodness. In addition, because training looks at
inputs, not outcomes, it is easy to measure and success is very attainable. Moreover, a training
remedy for a Goodness problem supports a cognitively attractive story of ignorance rather than
malicious non-compliance. None of these rationales turn much on efficacy, and indeed, diversity
and anti-harassment training, for example, are very widespread even though they do not
generally seem to promote race or gender integration in the workplace or reduce the prevalence
of workplace harassment. 161 But the account of the Occupy issue, above, demonstrates that
training works in other ways as well. While moderate amounts of workplace training are
unlikely to produce experts in any complicated field, training by Office of Goodness staff can
alert the trainees about “warning flags,” so that they know to seek assistance when such an issue
arises. In-house training also exposes the trainees to the office performing the training, ratifying
that office as expert and respected, and placing it in the personal networks of those trained.
Finally, training and technical assistance allow an Office of Goodness to offer a service to
another office in its agency, keeping the relationship from being uniformly conflictual.
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Cf. Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to Enemies, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 2193 (2012) (analyzing
reasons to delegate a decision to a party that does not share the delegator’s views).
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See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Erin L. Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: Professional Construction of Legal
Compliance in Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1203 (2007); Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin, & Erin Kelly,
Best Practices or Best Guesses? Diversity Management and the Remediation of Inequality, 71 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL
REV. 589 (2006).
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B. Responsive tools
Additional tools respond to practices already underway that may conflict with Goodness.
Here I treat two of those methods— program or operational review, and investigation of
individual or systemic problems:
(1)
Program or operational review. The laptop search impact assessment described
above is a species of program review. 162 So too is the demographic data analysis adopted as a
result of that review. Program review is a broad genus, covering examination of all types of
policy, policy implementation, and practices. A few observations follow:
First, it seems likely that the dynamics of these sorts of reviews will often depend on
whether they are deemed special or routine. A review that is special usually begins with some
kind of trigger, which frames the expectations about the review by suggesting that a problem
may well exist, and therefore makes it less aggressive for the Office of Goodness to, in the event,
find a problem. In addition, special reviews are more likely to receive a great deal of time,
effort, and attention, where such resources are harder to muster for routine reviews. 163
Second, the public or non-public nature of a review is important, but the effects of the
choice are complicated. If a review is public, it functions as “a threat and a means for inviting
external oversight.” 164 That means that the Office of Goodness is bound to receive much more
pressure from other agency offices to make it relatively gentle—but the office whose program is
under review is also under much more pressure to accede to recommendations. As Mark Moore
and Jane Gates wrote about Inspectors General, “it . . . seems clear that the effectiveness of IGs
is greatest when they can operate with the implicit threat of publicity and congressional attention
rather than its reality. When an issue escalates, there is a real risk that program managers will
dig in their heels, frustrating implementation of proposed changes.” 165 Inspectors General have
final authority over their reports, which allows this threat to be a realistic one. A crucial question
arises whether the Office of Goodness has the authority to override suggestions as to the content
of a report that is public, or whether, instead, the report itself is subject to some kind of fairly
coercive clearance process. 166 If there is a coercive clearance process for a public report, one can
expect that process to exert potentially irresistible pressure to soften its content. As for a nonpublic report, unless (like the USDA civil rights office) an Office of Goodness has final or near162

On impact assessments in particular, see, e.g., SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984); KAUFMAN, RED TAPE,
supra note 158, at 49; Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 5.
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Cf. RICHARD E. MORGAN, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE: MONITORING DISSENT IN AMERICA 152 (1980) (“In the
immediate aftermath of the intelligence scandals, anyone in the Justice Department assigned the task of reviewing an
FBI domestic intelligence investigation will naturally take it seriously. But inevitably, if the task is an additional
duty for those who must undertake it, it may become devalued to a quick look and a routine ‘sign off.’).
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Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 5.
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Moore & Gates, supra note 5, at 73.
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See, e.g., Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 5 (“[D]uring her tenure Kelly
successfully prevented DHS or the White House from exercising editorial control over reports issued by her office
or privacy impact assessments, although her annual report did go through a review.”).
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final authority not just to make recommendations but to insist that they be carried out, a nonpublic report may be plainer spoken but is likely to be at least somewhat less influential.
Without anticipated public exposure of at least some summary of findings and recommendations,
there is less reason for disagreeing operational offices to accede to a program review’s
recommendations. At that point, the Office of Goodness’s goal has to be to persuade an
authoritative decisionmaker, such as the agency’s Secretary, to resolve an intraorganizational
dispute in its favor—a unattractive position to put the Secretary in, and in any event, one that
requires the Office of Goodness to make a large expenditure of organizational capital.
Third, unless an Office of Goodness possesses sufficient influence that it need not care
about maintaining collegial relations within its agency, a program review is likely to be
perceived as much more legitimate if it is undertaken at the request of some important
stakeholder or principal (Congress or the Secretary, for example), or based on some objective
feature of the situation (say, a death). Of course an Office of Goodness can affirmatively seek an
assignment by an agency principal to conduct a review, if its leaders believe such a review would
prove useful. But without that assignment—which is to say, without acknowledgement of a
potential problem by an authority outside the Office—assertion of autonomy to review extant
operational policies or practices is likely to be seen internally as at least power-grabbing and
possibly illegitimate.
(2)
Complaint investigation. What makes an investigation different from a program
review is that investigations look (at least initially) at particular facts and results, examining the
effects of some program, activity, or conduct on an individual or individuals. The description
above of the Border Patrol interpretation issue illustrates the dynamics of an Office of Goodness
investigation, performed by USDA’s highly empowered civil rights office.
Many many offices within government agencies do internal investigations. To name just
a few, Inspector Generals’ offices explore the possibility of criminal charges being brought 167;
ethics offices and offices of professional responsibility consider the possibility of various types
of professional discipline; security offices investigate security breaches. The purpose of an
Office of Goodness complaint system is often more prospective. As Kaufman wrote about
ombudsman’s offices, “If the ombudsman finds merit in a complaint, the expectation is that the
accused agency will normally accede to his finding and redress the grievance as he recommends.
. . . The complainant, in short, would enjoy the services of a well-equipped champion whose
resources would be comparable to those of other parts of the bureaucracy, a champion whose
performance was measured by triumphs over bureaucratic adversaries.” 168 At DHS, because
CRCL lacks authority either to prosecute or to discipline, individual wrongdoing is largely left to
those other offices that have such authority. (Other Offices of Goodness in other agencies may
possess the authority to investigate and sanction. 169) And because CRCL mostly lacks authority
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IGs offices do many other types of reviews as well. See sources cited supra note 27.
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KAUFMAN, RED TAPE, supra note 158, at 95-96.
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See Dickinson, Military Lawyers, supra note 26, at 24-25.
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to provide individual remedies, that too, is left to different systems. 170 Instead, CRCL uses
complaint investigations as a foundation for the same sorts of more systematic recommendations
that might come out of a program review. 171 This is evidently similar to the approach taken by
USDA’s civil rights office to its Border Patrol interpretation investigation, described above.
Why have Offices of Goodness investigations, then? Several reasons seem important.
Investigation authority means that an Office of Goodness can conduct a targeted program review
without being accused of self-aggrandizement—the agenda is set by complaints, not by the
Office itself. In addition, becoming a regular recipient of complaints opens a window for the
Office into agency operations and their impacts. This is particularly true if the complaint process
is constructed to facilitate tracking of large numbers of complaints. (Recall that one of the
recommendations adopted as a result of CRCL’s Electronic Device Searching Impact
Assessment was modification of the check-off options for traveler complaints, to include
complaints about allegedly abusive searches and interviews, allowing much easier monitoring of
the issue over time.) And correspondingly, authority to conduct investigations premised on
complaints allows an Office of Goodness to offer a service to the external advocacy and
community groups whose support I argue in Part III it needs to maintain effectiveness.
C. Boundary-spanning tools
I have mentioned several times above the interaction between an Office of Goodness and
those outside its agency who share a commitment to its assigned value, Goodness. The
relationship between the office and those external constituencies requires care and feeding. The
tools discussed here are outreach, document generation, and congressional reporting.
(1)
Outreach. A crucial aspect of Office of Goodness operations is boundary
spanning 172—maintaining connections to external constituencies of Goodness. Each Office of
Goodness offers an obvious organizational entry point to stakeholders that share its assigned
value. As discussed in the next section, secure connections are also vital to maintaining the
Office’s commitment to its assigned value. But even apart from that, where these connections
are secure and effective, they offer the Office of Goodness information about problems, ideas
170

For example, administrative claims may be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Note that CRCL’s
authority is broader for disability rights complaints brought under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1970.
See 6 C.F.R. pt. 15.
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See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ANN. REP., FY 2011, supra
note 16; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ANN. REP., FY 2010 (2011),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/crcl-annual-report-fy-2010.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013); DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ANN. REP., FY 2009 (2010), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/crcl-annual-report-fy-2009.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
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On the role and stresses of boundary-spanners in complex organizations, see, for example, Howard Aldrich,
Organizational Boundaries and Interorganizational Relations, 24 HUM. REL. 279 (1971); Howard Aldrich & Diane
Herker, Boundary Spanning Roles and Organization Structure, 2 ACAD. MANAGE. REV. 217 (1977); W. RICHARD
SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 203-13 (5th ed. 2002); Robert E. Spekman,
Influence and Information: An Exploratory Investigation of the Boundary Role Person’s Basis of Power, 22 ACAD.
MANAGE. J. 104 (1979).
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about solutions, political support in the Congress, and public back-up for contested positions
taken inside the agency. The “groups,” as non-profit advocacy organizations are sometimes
called in Washington, can do many things not easily available to a government office, from
talking to the press, to pressing an issue with a sympathetic congressional staffer, to an organized
protest. It is obviously better for an Office of Goodness if such moves are supportive, rather than
adverse to its own existence and its preferred outcomes. In addition, one of the Office’s claims
to influence within an agency is its ability to predict what steps will and will not provoke
controversy from groups that share its value.
So all things point Offices of Goodness towards robust engagement with organizations
dedicated to Goodness, by meeting and other methods. The Border Patrol interpretation section,
above, demonstrates some of the dynamics, as the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project and
others reached out to CRCL, and CRCL reported these groups’ concerns to Border Patrol and
named those concerns as one reason to issue new policy.
(2)
Document generation. Each Office of Goodness strategy produces documents,
which may set out a problem, finding, or solution. Those documents are a key part of Office
output. 173 They may be disclosed automatically or on request by, say, Congress, or under
FOIA. 174 Or, theoretically, 175 they could be leaked. However they get out, they are fodder for
external organizations and constituencies—particularly when the documentation supports those
organizations’ views. For example, the documentation of CRCL’s nonconcurrence with the
release of the Right-Wing Extremism paper bolstered the views of external organizations and
stakeholders that the paper was problematic. And it provided them with a talking point (“An
office inside DHS agrees that . . .”) Even if an Office’s conclusions do not accord with the
external users’ views, if the Office does a competent job gathering and analyzing the situation,
the resulting information can be highly useful to external actors, contributing to what Seth
Kreimer names the “ecology of transparency.” 176
(3)
Congressional reporting. As described in Part I’s discussion of CRCL’s statutory
authorities, Congress typically requires Offices of Goodness to include in their annual or other
congressional reports information that is either of interest to members of Congress or to their
constituencies. Indeed, it would be odd for Congress to omit such a requirement, which allows
Offices of Goodness to improve congressional oversight capacity. Placing a monitor inside the
agency and instructing that monitor to report back in the event of a problem is a variant of the
“fire-alarm” oversight strategy named (and analyzed most famously) by political scientists
Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 177 The strategy has pros and cons, from Congress’s
173

Cf. Daniel E. Walters, Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy: Administrative Law Against Political
Control, 28 J.L. & POL. 129 (2013).
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For a discussion of the development of FOIA as an accountability tool after the 9/11 attacks, see Seth F.
Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PENN. J. CONST. LAW 1011
(2008); GOLDSMITH, supra note 19, at 112-121.
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I am not aware of any leaks from CRCL, but of course it’s possible.
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See Kreimer, supra note 174.
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See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus
Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
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perspective. An Office of Goodness has internal access, which improves the penetration of the
fire alarm system beyond what can be expected of, say, an advocacy organization. On the other
hand, an Office of Goodness is subject to much more pressure than one of the outside advocacy
groups to minimize or fail to report its colleagues’ problems. 178 In addition, congressional
reporting depends on the Office maintaining at least sufficient influence to both find out about
problems, and at least sufficient autonomy or authority to report about them. Still, Offices
interested in having an impact are well advised to see congressional reporting not just as a chore
but an opportunity for influence. 179
The prior paragraph deals with the impact of congressional reporting after the fact. But
congressional reporting requirements have dynamic effects, too. If it requires an Office of
Goodness to publish both its recommendations and its agency’s response to them, Congress
simultaneously magnifies pressure on both the agency and on the Office, particularly if
congressional committees or staff are believed to monitor the reports, and potentially follow up
with letters, requests for briefings, or hearings. Public disclosure and the possibility the agency
might be called to account increases the stature of the Office’s recommendations and the
likelihood of concurrence. But it also imposes pressure on the Office to soft pedal and thereby
keep disagreements in the family. The point is that congressional reporting is double edged in
just the same way described above with respect to program reviews.
* * *
The tools just described can only affect what occurs within an Office of Goodness’s
agency if others in that agency care about the Office’s views and if those views are sometimes
different from those of other agency staff. These prerequisites for Office of Goodness
effectiveness are the subject of Part III.
IV. What Do Offices of Goodness Need?
Offices of Goodness cannot increase the amount of Goodness in an agency without two
capacities: (a) influence and (b) commitment. That is, Office staff must know about and be able
to affect agency activity, and they must wield such influence as they have in furtherance of
Goodness, their Office’s assigned value. In this Part, I argue that both influence and
commitment depend crucially on external reinforcement. 180
178

Perhaps this is why some of the Intelligence Community’s Civil Liberties Offices issue congressional reports
so opaque as to be useless as fire alarms. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEF. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES REP. FY2013, Q1,
at 2 (2013), available at http://dpclo.defense.gov/civil/Res_And_Pub/reports/FY13QTR1.pdf (last visited Aug. 17,
2013) (listing number of complaints by relevant constitutional amendment, and reporting only that some are
pending, and some have been reviewed).
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See Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking, supra note 5 (describing the DHS privacy office:
“Kelly framed her office’s direct-congressional-reporting function as both a right and an obligation, and emphasized
the function’s importance as a signal of structural independence”).
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The account I present is consonant with Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books
and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011) (describing how factors including the increasing influence of
privacy advocates and the rise of privacy professionals have pushed corporate privacy regimes from the procedural
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The argument begins with the observation that Offices of Goodness exist to bring into
their agencies not just a value that is not primary, but one that constrains or even conflicts with
the agency’s raison d’etre. For reasons to do with culture, expertise, interest groups, and
congressional oversight, agencies tend to develop a strong and univalent sense of mission. As
James Q. Wilson wrote in his classic treatment of bureaucracy:
A sense of mission becomes the basis, explicitly or implicitly, on which personnel are
recruited, trained, rewarded, and managed. Philip Selznick, from whom my views on this
matter are so obviously derived, has remarked that an organizational mission is not
simply the formal goal of the organization but the distinctive and valued set of behaviors,
selected from among a large number of behaviors, by which activity toward a goal and
organizational maintenance are reconciled. Mission, in short, implies much more than the
neutral, technical term, “means.” 181
Scholars of bureaucracy and administration have long explained that agencies have difficulty
simultaneously internalizing a mission and its constraints, much less conflicting goals. 182 Since
the entire point of an Office of Goodness is constraint or opposition, this means that every Office
of Goodness faces continual pressure to slide into disempowered irrelevance or to be tamed by
capture or assimilation. 183 These dangers are magnified by the fact that a powerless Office of
Goodness is far from useless either to its agency or to Congress. Even if everyone inside the
agency knows that the Office has little or no influence, both the agency and the Congress can
continue to reap some of the benefits of its existence, by claiming, technically accurately, to have
an Office dedicated to Goodness. Stakeholders, whether in or out of the agency, who are less
interested in the value Goodness than in seeming to care about Goodness may be well served by
STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984) (highlighting as crucial factors for the success of an
internal compliance unit the clarity of its goals, its staff’s commitment to those goals, its autonomy, and its external
support). Todd LaPorte’s work on “high-reliability organizations” provides another useful analogy. See, e.g., Todd
R. La Porte, Challenges of Assuring High Reliability When Facing Suicidal Terrorism, in SEEDS OF DISASTER,
ROOTS OF RESPONSE: HOW PRIVATE ACTION CAN REDUCE PUBLIC VULNERABILITY 99 (Auerswald et al, eds., 2006)
(“Highly reliable operations . . . are difficult to sustain in the absence of external enforcement. Continuous attention
both to achieving organizational missions and to avoiding serious failures also requires repeated interactions with
elements in the external environment, not only to ensure resources, but, as importantly, to buttress management
resolve to maintain the internal relations outlined above and to nurture highly reliable organizations’ culture of
reliability.”).
181

JAMES Q. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS 14 (1978). Among
Selznick’s relevant work is, for example, PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL
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C. MCCOOL, STAKING OUT THE TERRAIN (2d ed. 1996); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as
Lobbyists, COLUM. L. REV. 2217 (2005).
183

Offices of Goodness be unwelcome within agencies for other reasons as well. As Kaufman wrote, an
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a neutered Office, to which assignments can be made without fear of disruption. 184 And
stakeholders who care more may not be able to detect the Office’s fettered circumstances. On
the other hand, if an Office truly lacks all influence, that fact is bound to get out to some extent,
making it an unconvincing standard-bearer and therefore fairly useless. So one would expect
Offices of Goodness to face efforts to limit but not quite eliminate their influence. I argue in this
part that Offices will be hard pressed to resist such efforts without external reinforcement and
support.
Even a powerless Office of Goodness poses some risk to its agency: without much
influence itself, it may, for example, nonetheless produce records able to be used against the
agency by more muscular Goodness advocates. This prospect can be eliminated by capture or
assimilation, 185 which I mean to encompass not just personally self-interested behavior but any
systematic inclination by Office of Goodness staff to undervalue Goodness compared to the
agency’s primary mission. (As discussed below, the mechanisms of capture may be quite
different than in the ordinary usage in positive political theory.) Pressures towards capture or
assimilation are likely to be even stronger than those towards impotence. After all, unlike a
disempowered Office, a tame Office of Goodness can be given the trappings of influence without
threat to the agency. 186 Again, this part’s argument is that resistance to capture can be bolstered
by a variety of boundary-spanning techniques, to ensure that Office staff maintain external
Goodness advocates as an important reference group:
A. Influence
An Office of Goodness cannot be effective if its staff is frozen out of meetings, its advice
can be disregarded without consequence, or its activities face resource constraints that prevent it
from undertaking or participating in important projects. Offices of Goodness do not seek
autonomy (like so many other federal offices), but they must seek influence. As in so many
situations in federal agencies, “[t]he principal source of power is a constituency.” 187 And of
course Offices are not the passive recipients of constituency support; they can help build support,
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See, e.g., John W. Meyer & W. Richard Scott, Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality 31
(updated ed., 1991) (“By designing a formal structure that adheres to the prescriptions of myths in the institutional
environment, an organization demonstrates that it is acting on collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate
manner”).
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Ordinarily, the phrase “regulatory capture” denotes “a situation in which an industry which is regulated
controls a regulatory agency’s policies.” Michael E. Levine, Regulatory Capture, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 267, 267 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). In our setting, however, the agency
itself is in a role like a regulated entity, and the Office of Goodness is akin to a regulator. For a summary of capture
theory, see id.; Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public
Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990). For foundational treatments, see, for example,
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL. J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971); Richard Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT SCI. 335 (1974); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More
General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 211 (1976).
186

On the analogous issue of “cosmetic compliance” in the corporate law context, see, e.g., Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003).
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as well as rely on it. 188 The potential supporters are Congress, non-governmental groups, other
agencies, and the White House. Observations on many of the relevant dynamics follow:
Congress, the White House, and the budget. Without sufficient resources, the Office will,
for example, lack staff. And the tools described above can be quite staff intensive. 189 Budgetary
needs require support to satisfy. Like nearly all federal agencies, an Office of Goodness depends
on the Congress for its budget. And Congress—or at least the members of Congress in the
President’s party—begin with the administration’s budget, submitted by the Office of
Management and Budget, within the White House. Thus the Office needs support from at least
one of the key budgetary players—the agency’s budget decisionmaker (who provides a proposed
budget to OMB), the White House, or someone in the Congress. Others have explored the
federal budgetary process in detail, 190 and I will not belabor the point, except to observe that an
administration’s budgetary requests for Offices of Goodness might well require particular
scrutiny by the Office’s supporters; various parts of the administration might want to starve
particular Offices, if they can, given their watchdog function. 191
Congress and the oversight function. Perhaps less obvious (though partially broached
above) is Congress’s nonbudgetary role in buttressing the influence of Offices of Goodness. As
already explained, congressional reporting is one way Offices of Goodness carry out their fire
alarm function, alerting Congress to issues members interested in Goodness might want to know
about. Congressional reporting is simultaneously a key tool within the agency, because exposure
of an Office’s recommendations and the agency’s responses pressures the agency to agree to the
recommendations (while simultaneously pressuring the Office to tone those recommendations
down, so that the agency’s leaders don’t mind saying yes). The additional point here is that
188

Many sources analyze the ways in which federal offices build their varied constituencies. See, e.g.,
KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER, supra note 14; JAMES Q. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS, supra note 181; Cuellar,
supra note 14; DANIEL P. CARPENTER, BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY, supra note 14, CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND
POWER, supra note 14.
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When DHS’s CRCL took on the new task of intelligence product clearance, the Administration’s FY 2011
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HOMELAND SEC., CONG. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, FY 2011, at OSEM-23, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_congressional_budget_justification_fy2011.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
This was about 5% of the office’s total budget. The funds were not, however, forthcoming. See DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., CONG. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, FY 2012, at OSEM-21, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-congressional-budget-justification-fy2012.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
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OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-11, PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a11_current_year/a11_2013.pdf (last
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More generally, see, e.g., AARON WILDAVSKY, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (1988); ALLEN
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congressional reporting’s influence is likely to fade if congressional committees, members, or
staff do not follow up on at least some of what is revealed, whether the follow-up occurs by
letter, requests for staff or member briefings, committee hearings, or any other of the myriad
ways in which congressional actors make their views and interests known. 192
White House. The White House has many non-budgetary levers that influence what goes
on in the agencies. Of course this is true for the President and those very close to him. As thenprofessor Elena Kagan summarized in her analysis of “Presidential Administration,” “a President
has many resources at hand to influence the scope and content of administrative action. Agency
officials may accede to his preferences because they feel a sense of personal loyalty and
commitment to him; because they desire his assistance in budgetary, legislative, and
appointments matters; or in extreme cases because they respect and fear his removal power.” 193
But, like every other institution in this Article (and with credit for the phrase to Ken Shepsle), the
White House is a “they,” not an it. 194 For any Office of Goodness, at least dozens of the many
hundreds of staff in the Executive Office of the President 195 can either support or diminish the
Office’s influence. White House staff—assigned to the White House Counsel’s office, Domestic
Policy Council, the National Security Staff, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, the
Office of Public Engagement, etc.—can function very like congressional staff after a “fire alarm”
is rung, reaching into the agency with particular vigor if something or someone directs their
attention to a particular problem. White House staff can request or ignore Office views on the
resulting issues, and can include or exclude Office staff and leadership from the resulting
meetings. Even though agencies strive to present a united front to the White House, involvement
in White House meetings and discussions is very empowering, validating the importance and
“equities” (a word used in Washington to mean appropriate role) of the offices included and
necessitating at least their grudging acquiescence in the agency position. If, on the other hand,
White House staff excludes or gives short shrift to the views of Office staff or leadership, that
diminishes Office influence within the agency. 196
192

See, e.g., McCubbins & Schwartz, Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, supra note 177; JOEL D. AUERBACH,
KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (1990); DODD & SCHOTT, CONGRESS
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Other agencies. Offices of Goodness can be shored up or undermined by offices in other
agencies. As DeShazo and Freeman have pointed out, “agencies can be prompted to take their
secondary missions more seriously when Congress enhances interagency lobbying by increasing
the power of other agencies, which derive relevant expertise and interests from their own
statutory mandates, to lobby the implementing agency.” 197 Offices of Goodness are, to use this
language, assigned to a “secondary mission” within their agency. So the kinds of efforts
DeShazo and Freeman describe, in which agencies influence each other by “providing useful
information, threatening litigation, or threatening to go over the head of the agency to members
of Congress or higher-ups in the White House” all interact with Offices of Goodness’ efforts.
This is obvious in two of the examples, above, dealing with the Border Patrol interpretation issue
and the NCTC data ingestion and retention guidelines. In the first, the FOIA’d documents
evidence substantial impact from what DeShazo and Freeman might call “lobbying” of DHS by
DOJ and USDA. The result was to push DHS towards the more civil-rights-friendly policy of
restricting Border Patrol’s interpretive services offered to non-DHS law enforcement. On the
other hand, the DHS position in the NCTC data-retention matter, which had evidently been
agreed to within the Department (including by CRCL and the Privacy Office), prior to objections
by ODNI, was overruled in the interagency process.
The point is not simply that another agency might agree or disagree with an Office of
Goodness, although as just seen either is possible. It is that an Office of Goodness may be able
either to call upon or to fend off a like-minded part of another agency, increasing its own firepower in the former instance or bolstering its agency’s (highly-valued) autonomy in the latter.
Agreement is not a prerequisite for assistance. If, for example, an outside agency understood to
be committed to Goodness takes a harder stance on some issue than an Office of Goodness, that
might actually enhance the Office of Goodness’s position, making its preferred approach the
compromise. But less happily for the Office of Goodness, the other agency may undermine it in
several ways. If the outside agency takes a softer stance than the Office of Goodness, that may
defeat the Office’s point of view in the specific instance and harm the Office’s reputation more
generally. Or the outside agency’s harder stance, if it wins the day, may damage the Office’s
influence by rebutting its claim to its agency that following Office advice will assist in defending
against attacks on the agency’s autonomy. 198
Advocacy Groups. As sociologists have explored, for decades American corporations
have created offices to mirror their regulatory environment, putting in place environmental,
EEO, and labor relations offices, for example. 199 Offices of Goodness constitute the equivalent
strategy for government agencies, mirroring external stakeholder values and providing an
obvious point of access for advocacy groups interested in constraining the agency’s operations.
So a key role for many Offices of Goodness is to manage the relationship between the agency
197
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and the advocacy groups that are the agency’s natural opponents, but the Office’s natural
constituents—to take their phone calls and meetings, answer at least some of their questions, and
blunt their criticisms. For this to work, the Office has to provide the groups with something of
value. 200 That is likely to be information and access, whether via informational meetings or by
producing reports and documents that advocates can in turn use. Other possibilities include a
complaint process, which might produce individual or policy remedies for problems, or at the
least, serve process values. Advocacy groups hope for more, of course; what they really want is
that that Offices informed by their concerns and analysis may be able to accomplish sought
reforms. 201 And if the Office is influential, that sometimes happens.
As with each player discussed in this section, advocacy groups can augment or diminish
the influence of an Office of Goodness. Offices of Goodness often owe their very existence to
advocates, 202 and lean heavily on their support. In part this is because Offices of Goodness are
sharply limited in how open they can be with their would-be-sponsors in Congress. For
example, one administration rule governing the budgetary process is that in congressional
briefings, public meetings, and the like, all executive branch officials must support the
President’s budget, once it exists. So if an Office of Goodness employee is asked in a
congressional briefing whether the Office needs more money than the President’s budget
provides, at least the explicit public answer must be no. Both the agency and the White House
use various methods to enforce that answer—for example, by sending a chaperone to such
meetings. To state the same point more generally, Offices of Goodness are part of the very
agency it is their job to constrain, which means they must walk a very fine line in discussing
their needs, successes, and recommendations even with outsiders on whom they depend, whether
Congress or the White House Accordingly, in both budgetary and policy processes, an Office of
Goodness benefits greatly from having a surrogate or advocate who can speak more plainly. If
advocacy groups find value in the Office of Goodness, they are likely to play that role.
Within the agency, it can actually be quite helpful to the Office if advocates somewhat
outflank it in their zeal for Goodness. That frames the Office’s own views as moderate, helping
it to maintain its credibility within the agency. If, however, the divergence between the external
Goodness position and that of the Office is too great—as it seems to have been in the laptop
200

Of course, leaders in Offices of Goodness may wish to assist advocacy organizations for simpler ideological
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border search case study—that may be quite harmful to the Office. An Office of Goodness may
gain collegiality points, internally, when it takes public hits for its agency’s position. But one of
the reasons that the agency follows the Office’s advice is in order to at least somewhat assuage
criticism from the advocacy groups. If following Office advice does not accomplish that goal,
the Office’s internal influence will decline. So, in the laptop border search situation, we saw that
CRCL made several recommendations made in its impact assessment, each accepted by CBP.
But accepting those suggestions seems to have elicited no good will at all from the advocacy
community. The result is likely to influence the CBP audience for the next set of
recommendations, as agency officials question whether a CRCL-proposed reform really has any
external constituency.
A final way in which advocacy groups can increase or maintain the influence of an Office
of Goodness is by making its predictions come true. If an Office predicts a firestorm of public
concern about a particular policy, should that policy be implemented and become known, it is
advocates that create the firestorm, if they can. (Efforts to create a firestorm failed in the NCTC
example, above.) And if the Office argues within its agency that a policy (perhaps after
modifications) is fine, it is advocates that don’t create a firestorm. The point is not that advocacy
groups carry out their efforts in order to support the Office of Goodness, but rather that if the
Office proves wrong in its predictions, it is likely to lose influence. This creates all the more
incentive for Office staff to discuss issues with various groups in advance, where possible.
Law and Courts. For many reasons, advocates often prefer law talk to policy talk: legal
rules govern more than one agency; can outlast a single administration; may be courtenforceable; and, perhaps most important, resonate with their rights-based politics/orientation. 203
But Office of Goodness reference to law is double-edged, for several reasons. On the one hand,
reference to legal obligations is extremely powerful, perhaps even trumping of other concerns.
On the other hand, for an Office of Goodness that is not in a General Counsel’s office, framing
an issue as a legal one can set up the losing side of an infra-agency conflict; it is lawyers in the
General Counsel’s office, not Office of Goodness staff—even if they are also lawyers—who play
the institutional lead role with respect to legal questions. In addition, if a question is framed as
legal and is likely to be litigated, that cedes authority to the courts, which may well decide
against the views of the Office of Goodness. Agency dynamics and the state of the legal
precedent will thus dictate whether Offices of Goodness are more likely to frame their
commitments in policy rather than legal terms.
All that said, Offices of Goodness are likely to lean heavily on court decisions that agree
with them, or even tilt their way; in the political economy of an agency, such decisions are
valuable currency. Offices may also make legal arguments with respect to issues in which court
authority is mixed or that have not yet been litigated in federal court. On the other hand, if many
courts have come out against a particular position, that dampens the availability of that position
for an Office of Goodness; it would be unlikely to take a legal position more protective than
court decisions on an issue that has been repeatedly litigated. So for example, in the laptop
border search case study, above, at the time CRCL’s impact assessment was completed, two
203
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district courts had rendered opinions questioning the right of the government to conduct laptop
searches absent reasonable suspicion, 204 but the federal courts of appeals had, as of the time of
the impact assessment, reversed in both cases and uniformly upheld such searches. No internal
office like CRCL is likely to opine publicly, and adversely to its agency’s frequently asserted
litigation position, that those courts are simply wrong.
* * *
Offices of Goodness are inherently under siege; efforts to push them aside and render
them irrelevant are part and parcel of their agency’s mission focus. To resist certainly does not
require that all the external sources of influence just discussed operate in their favor. But if
none do, an Office of Goodness will be hard pressed to retain any influence. The next section
examines how to improve the odds that what influence they have is used in service of their
assigned value—how, that is, they can maintain their commitment, and avoid cooptation or
capture.
B. Commitment
Offices of Goodness are likely to experience erosion in their staff’s commitment to the
assigned value, Goodness, as both collegial and careerist pressures take their toll. By collegial
pressures, I mean the ordinary impact of working with mission-focused colleagues not in the
Office of Goodness. As Herbert Simon said in his foundational work on administration, a person
“does not live or months or years in a particular position in an organization, exposed to some
streams of communication, shielded from others, without the most profound effects upon what
he knows, believes, attends to, hopes, wishes, emphasizes, fears, and proposes.” 205 By careerist
pressures, I mean the impact of an anticipated career path within the agency, which will push
Office of Goodness staff to develop reputations as “team players” whose approach meshes well
and enhances the agency’s primary mission. I suggest below that efforts to resist capture must
counter both; those who want an Office of Goodness to avoid it must ensure that Office staff
conceptualize Goodness advocates as part of their reference group, and that staff have available
and attractive career paths involving Goodness advocacy.
Numerous scholars have written about professional identification in government
agencies, and how professional commitments and professional reference groups, and the cultural
distinctions they produce, can be outcome-determinative. Magill and Vermeule recast a good
deal of administrative law in these terms:
The ongoing contest over the roles of expertise, legalism, and politics in administrative
law can thus be viewed in sociological terms as a contest among different types of
professionals, with different types of training and priorities. Legal rules and institutional
204
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structures that empower scientists or engineers will conduce to a technocratic agency
culture, while rules and structures that empower lawyers will carry in their wake the
distinctive culture of lawyers. 206
In study after study, the empowering of one or another professional group at a particular agency
influences that agency’s approach to its assignments and challenges. 207 Indeed, James Q. Wilson
argues that the very essence of being a professional is to be “someone who receives important
occupational rewards from a reference group whose membership is limited to people who have
undergone specialized formal education and have accepted a group-defined code of proper
conduct. The more the individual allows his or her behavior to be influenced by the desire to
obtain rewards from this reference group, the more professional is his or her orientation.”
Accordingly, “the way such a person defines his or her task may reflect more the standards of the
external reference group than the preferences of the internal management.” 208 And
“institutionalist” sociologists agree that professional networks exert real influence over their
participants who work in scattered organizations. 209
So for values closely associated with a particular profession, no doubt hiring a critical
mass of such professionals can assist in safeguarding the value. Again, to quote Wilson,
“Politicians and interest groups know that professionals can define tasks in ways that are hard for
administrators to alter, and so one strategy for changing an organization is to induce it to recruit a
professional cadre whose values are congenial to those desiring the change.” 210 In one example
of this strategy, we learn from recent work, lawyers within national security agencies are
assigned to ensure a value I will summarize by the term “lawfulness.” 211 Other examples
abound. 212 But what if the profession in question does not homogenously embrace the relevant
value, Goodness? Lawyers’ professional commitments may include lawfulness as an overriding
value (although the professional value of client-representation 213 no doubt competes). But taking
the example of DHS’s CRCL, and its more contested assigned values of civil rights and civil
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liberties, the legal profession is certainly not uniformly committed to those values. 214 After all,
in every civil rights case there are lawyers on both sides. Accordingly, simple professional ties
are far from enough to keep Office staff committed to those values, even if they are all lawyers.
What is needed is ties not to the legal profession as a whole, but to a much more specific
professional community. In the case of a civil rights Office, for example, the key would seem to
be sufficient staff connection to the civil rights community that its values remain salient and
influential notwithstanding the contrary pressures inherent in the Office’s position within its
agency. The Office benefits greatly, that is, if its staff conceptualize themselves as, for example,
“civil rights lawyers” rather than “lawyers in a civil rights office.”
Connections to a corner of a profession depend on some combination of hiring,
networking, and career paths. The first of these is the most obvious; Office of Goodness can hire
experienced staff from organizations that share its assigned value. 215 In practice, this strategy
may run into implementation problems because of constraints on federal hiring under the civil
service human resources rules. 216 But assuming hiring managers can hire more or less who they
choose, bringing in new employees directly from advocacy groups is a common strategy for
Offices of Goodness that seek to ensure staff commitment. For example, Douglas NeJaime
explains that during the first Obama Administration, many civil rights offices hired numerous
“attorneys with significant cause lawyering experience,” “signal[ing] the likelihood of increased
action on issues important to the organizations from which these lawyers came.” 217 And
Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan’s account of two federal privacy offices similarly
stresses that hiring staff experienced in the “privacy field” was crucial to the greater success of
the DHS office, compared to the Department of State office. 218
But even if they were hired from a Goodness organization, as staff gain experience within
the government, that affiliation is likely to fade and their reference group to shift to their more
immediate peers. An Office of Goodness can push back against this shift by promoting
opportunities for its staff to network with Goodness advocates, sending them to conferences,
workshops, and the like. My guess would be that even more important is the staff’s expectation
about their own career paths. If Office of Goodness staff think of their own likely path as limited
214

My point is in some tension with Laura Dickinson’s analysis of JAG Corps lawyers, whom she finds
dedicated to human rights norms via their commitment to the idea of the rule of law. See Dickinson, Military
Lawyers, supra note 26, at 21-22.
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While his topic was not an Office of Goodness, in his magisterial analysis of the Federal Drug
Administration, Daniel Carpenter similarly attributes much of its success to its leaders’ hiring strategy. See DANIEL
CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REPUTATION AT THE FDA
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to other agency offices, that is unhelpful for maintaining their commitment to Goodness. But
what if they see more possibilities in which Goodness remains important? This could be the case
if promotion within the Office is available and depends on demonstrated commitment, or if they
contemplate going to work for a different agency’s Office of Goodness that shares the same
value commitment or for an advocacy organization. All these prospects would encourage staff to
safeguard their own reputations for commitment to Goodness and, less calculated but no less
important, to keep Goodness advocates as a key reference group. 219
Conclusion
This Article has explored an important but understudied institutional device used to
induce large bureaucratic governmental institutions to heed certain “precarious values,”
notwithstanding the tension between those values and the agencies’ primary commitments. I
began by showing how one important Office of Goodness exercised real but limited influence in
four controversies. I then used those examples to inform detailed analysis of the tools Offices of
Goodness may use, and the prerequisites for Office effectiveness.
In the Article’s introduction, I mentioned that the Office of Goodness strategy has been
proposed as a solution for two very high-profile controversies. In a recent press conference, the
President endorsed a Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer for the National Security Agency, and
also some kind of civil liberties advocate for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 220 The
details of any proposal are not yet available [UPDATE LATER], but some of the insights just
developed may inform the institutional design choices of would-be reformers, so that reforms are
more likely to actually serve the “Goodness” values of privacy and civil liberties. At the NSA, it
is easy to see pitfalls. How could a complaint system be constructed when the subjects of
surveillance do not know their own status? Would an NSA Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer
be empowered to pursue those values broadly conceived, or limited to more narrow conceptions
of lawfulness? If the latter, it would be difficult for the new Officer to avoid (or surmount)
conflict with the General Counsel. Would NSA Privacy and Civil Liberties Office staff be able
to discuss or report publically about any problems or recommendations? If not, what kind of
external reinforcement can they rely upon to maintain their influence within the NSA? And so
on.
The idea of harnessing adversarial process for the FISA court seems less fraught.
American law has a long tradition of bringing outsider lawyers into litigation processes; the
contours of the role of government-paid challenger—e.g., public defender—are solidly
established in the legal profession. I surmise that this would make role commitment far easier to
maintain. Moreover, external influence-reinforcement seems less crucial when there is a
formally structured decisionmaking process with its own norms of reasoned elaboration. 221
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See supra page 2.
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I don’t mean to be naïve in making this point. Of course there is abundant reason in litigation settings to
worry that “the haves come out ahead.” See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
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The overall point—and this is the Article’s broadest lesson—is that Office of Goodness
efficacy should not be taken for granted. Unless the goal is purely cosmetic, a new Office’s tools
must be carefully prepared, and its influence and commitment purposefully produced and
maintained. This Article makes just a start on the needed research.

the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). But in litigation, the “have nots” can at least get a seat
at the table and a chance to speak. Without external-reinforcement, an Office of Goodness may be denied even
access.
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